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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the incentives for hospital cost 
control embedded within nine health care reimbursement systems. 
Specific attention is given to the impact of each system on five areas 
of physician behavior felt to possess potential for the reduction of 
hospital costs, without an accompanying reduction in health care 
quality. An adverse selection agency model (specifically adapted to 
the medical setting) is developed which is used to demonstrate the 
level of health care inputs that would be ordered by the physician 
under each reimbursement system. This information is used to rank the 
nine health care reimbursement systems from the standpoint of patient 
welfare. Since fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement do not provide 
an incentive for the physician to choose the action vector most 
appropriate to the patient, a brief discussion is given of the private 
information that must be revealed under each reimbursement system to 
allow the patient to write a forcing contract. This study concludes 
with recommendations for future research to increase the effectiveness 
of two of the health care reimbursement systems evaluated. 
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The gross amount paid by the patient for the services 
provided by the physician and the hospital, where 
d(.) = s(.) + t(.). 
The expected gross payment. 
The set of all physician payment schedules. 
A.vector representing the actions of the physician 
where~= Cp,a,n,w,~>· 
The set of all physician action vectors. 
The patient's subjective probability distribution 
(i.e. the patient's beliefs at the beginning 
of the period concerning e). 
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The physician's subjective probability 
distribution (i.e. the physician's beliefs at the 
beginning of the period concerning e ) • 
The utility of the patient, which is an increasing 
function of wealth. 
The opportunity cost of hiring the physician. 
The certainty equivalent of H. 
The utility of the physician, which is an increasing 
function of wealth. 
The cost of a medical audit. 
The probability of e. when preventive medicine 
1 
is not given at the beginning of the period. 
The probability of e. when preventive medicine 
1 
is given at the beginning of the period. 
The residual portion of d(.} that the physician 
retains after paying t(.) to the hospital. 
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The expected residual payment. 
The portion of d(.) that is paid to the hospital for 
services rendered. 
The expected hospital payment. 
The gross income of the patient. 
The payment for preventive medicine under a 
fee-for-service arrangement. 
A vector representing the level of diagnostic 
ancillary services chosen by the physician, where 
O represents an inadequate level, and 1 represents 
an adequate level. 
The state of nature which is the patient's 
state of health. 
The set of all the states of nature. This is 
partitioned into three categories which are defined 





A vector representing the level of hospital equipment 
and facilities chosen by the physician, where O 
represents an inappropriate level and 1 represents an 
appropriate level. 
A vector representing the level of preventive 
medicine chosen by the physician, where O represents 
no preventive medicine and 1 represents an appropriate 
level of preventive medicine. 
A vector representing the length of hospital stay 
chosen by the physician, where O represents an 
excessive level and 1 represents an appropriate 
level. 
A vector representing the level of surgical services 
chosen by the physician, where O represents and 




INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT 
OF THE PROBLEM 
One of the primary objectives of accounting is to provide owners 
and managers with the analytical tools necessary for decision making 
and control. Financial accounting is concerned with the revelation of 
private information that can be used by external users in the 
valuation of corporate assets and evaluation of managerial 
performance. Managerial accounting is concerned with the provision of 
information that can assist managers and other internal users in the 
selection of alternatives, and in the establishment of policies and 
procedures that will maximize the value of the firm. Managerial 
accounting tools have traditionally included product costing systems, 
budgeting systems, and cost-volume profit analysis. One managerial 
accounting tool that has received increasi~g attention in recent years 
is the employee fee system. With the recognition that employees are 
motivated by self interest, and can therefore be influenced by their 
form of reimbursement, managerial accountants are increasingly being 
asked to participate in the development and evaluation of fee systems 




One field where fee systems have received a substantial amount of 
attention in recent years is the health care industry. One reason for 
this concern is the increasing share of national resources being 
consumed by health care services. In 1965 Americans spent a total of 
42 billion dollars on health care. In 1981 this figure was 287 
billion dollars (u.s. Department of Commerce, 1982-1983, p. 101). One 
indicator of increasing hospital costs is the American Hospital 
Association's "Average Cost Per Patient Day Index" (ACPPD). In 
calculating hospital costs, this index adjusts for changes that occur 
over time in the volume and mix of hospital services. In 1950, the 
ACPPD was $15.62. In 1981 it was $251.02. Even when converted to 
constant dollars, the ACPPD was five times what it was in 1950, and 
nearly double what it was in 1966 (Eastaugh, 1981, p. 4). 
A second reason for the interest in fee systems is the recognition 
by policy makers that the health care industry lacks many of the· 
incentives for efficiency found in other sectors of the economy. 
Because of the technical nature of medical services, the consumer is 
not in a position to make fully competent evaluations concerning the 
quality and quantity of the medical care he receives. Not having the 
knowledge to determine the combinations of health care services that 
maximize his utility, he must delegate this decision to his physician 
who, due to the nature of the fee system, may be in a position to 
maximize profits at the expense of the patient by choosing less than 
optimally cost efficient inputs in the treatment of the patient's 
disease. 
Similar problems exist within the hospital. Since it is the 
physician who selects the hospital and orders the services it will 
provide, many hospitals view the physician as their primary customer 
and consequently compete on the extensiveness of the services that 
they can provide. Because of this, some economists view the hospital 
as a physician cooperative, operated to maximize the utility of the 
medical staff rather than minimize the cost to the patient (Pauly and 
Redisch, 1973). These factors, coupled with a philosophy that health 
care is a right whose distribution should not be left solely to the 
marketplace, have all served to weaken the incentives for cost 
efficiency found in other sectors of the economy. Any proposal for 
change, therefore, must recognize the unique characteristics of the 
health care industry and the important role that the physician plays 
in cost containment. 
The physician's important role in cost containment arises from 
the fact that he has been delegated almost complete decision making 
authority over health care production inputs. The physician not only 
provides advice on how much and what kinds of medical services the 
patient should consume, but provides many of the medical services to 
be consumed. According to Detsky (1978): 
This dual role of the physician as both the agent for 
demanding services and the supplier of those services is 
reinforced by the conditions of uncertainty, information 
gap, emotional nature of illness, ••• and the position of 
trust and confidence placed in the physician and hospital 
(p. 38). 
In an evaluation of the impact of physician behavior on health 
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care costs, one area believed to possess potential for cost reduction 
without an accompanying reduction in quality, is the hospital. In 
1978, hospitals consumed approximately 40 percent of all health care 
expenditures. High hospital costs are a result of the industry's high 
investment in both labor and capital equipment. According to 
statistics published by the American Hospital Association, the ave~age 
hospital has approximately 3.3 employees per patient (American 
Hospital Association, 1983, p. 185). In 1980, hospital construction 
costs (including the costs of furnishings and equipment) exceeded 
$150,000 per bed (Howard, 1984). 
While the administrator and board of governors are technically 
responsible for the operation of the hospital, the structure of the 
industry is such that the actions of the physicians are a primary, 
factor in hospital cost escalation. According to a recent article in 
the Wall Street Journal: 
Most hospital costs--estimates run as high as 75 percent to 
80 percent--result from the decisions of physicians, ..• 
Although not hospital employees, physicians are the ones 
responsible for deciding whether a patient should be 
admitted, what tests should be run, what procedures are 
needed, and when the patient is ready for discharge (Capron, 
1984, p. 16). 
Because it is the physician who selects the hospital, and the 
services it will provide, many hospitals view themselves as the agents 
of the physician, not the patient. While patient utility is increased 
by the production of quality health care inputs at the lowest posdible 
price, physician utility is a function of physician income, which in 
turn is largely dependent on the scope of hospital services provided. 
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Treatment at a community hospital where the physician holds medical 
staff privileges is preferred by the physician to treatment at a 
larger more specialized hospital where the patient must be referred to 
another physician. As a result, community hospitals will often 
procure complex equipment that should be reserved for larger, mor1e 
specialized facilities with patient volumes adequate to justify ~he 
acquisition (Eastaugh, 1981, pp. 42-44). 
In the evaluation of ways in which physician behavior might 
adversely affect hospital costs, five areas can be identified. These 
include: 
1. Absence of provision of preventive medicine. 
2. Excessive utilization of diagnostic ancillary services. 
3. Provision of excessive levels of hospital equipment and 
facilities. 
4. Excessive lengths of hospital stay. 
s. use of excessive surgical services. 
In addressing these problem areas, one objective of national 
health care policy might be to create a set of incentives that induce 
a physician to act in the patient's best interest, while still 
pursuing his own self interest. one area of research that has 
concentrated on the problems resulting from a divergence between !Self 
interest and cooperative behavior is agency theory. In agency theory, 
two situations are examined in which an agent may act in a manner 
inconsistent with the best interests of the principal. Both of these 
arise as a result of the principal being unable to motivate the ~gent 
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to perform optimally the duties for which he was hired. The principal 
hires the agent to provide labor inputs. If these inputs can be 
observed by the principal, then they can serve as the basis for the 
employment contract. If the principal is unable to observe the inputs 
of the agent, then the principal must select a surrogate for these 
inputs. If this surrogate does not accurately portray the inputs of 
the agent, and if the agent is motivated to provide inputs that are 
different than those the principal would choose, then moral hazard is 
said to arise. 
A second possible reason for divergence between cooperative and 
self interested behavior results when the agent bases his behavior on 
private information that cannot be verified by the principal. In this 
situation, the principal cannot determine whether the observed input 
was the appropriate choice, given the action rule that the principal 
wants the agent to use and the agent's private information. If the 
agent is motivated to misrepresent this information to implement an 
action rule different from that desired by the principal, then the 
problem of adverse selection arises. 
Since agency theory has demonstrated that the form of the fee 
schedule can significantly influence the input decisions of the agent, 
this study employs the agency model to evaluate the incentive 
structure of nine health care reimbursement systems (all of which are 
identified in Chapter Two) to determine their impact on physician 
behavior. Each reimbursement system is analyzed to determine the 
action choice of the physician. The patient welfare loss, determined 
7 
by each action choice, is then used to evaluate the nine health-care 
reimbursement systems. 
Summary of Content 
Chapter One introduces the problem of health care cost escalation 
(focusing specifically on hospital costs) and highlights the 
physician's important role in hospital cost containment. In addition 
it introduces agency theory, an analytical tool concerned with the 
impact of fee systems on employee behavior. The agency framework is 
used in this study to evaluate the incentive structure of nine health 
care reimbursement systems. Chapter Two defines the term 
"reimbursement system" as it is used in this study and introduces the 
nine health care reimbursement systems to be evaluated in Chapter 
Five. Chapter Three defines the five hospital cost areas of physician 
behavior potentially impacted by these nine reimbursement systems. In 
Chapter Four the traditional agency model is reviewed as are previous 
applications of this model to both industrial and medical 
environments. Attention is then focused on the development of an 
"Adverse Selection Model - Medical Setting'~ which is used to evaluate 
the incentives for health care cost control embedded within the nine 
reimbursement systems. Chapter Five utilizes the "Adverse Selection 
Model - Medical Setting" to analyze the nine reimbursement systems and 
their incentive effects on the five hospital cost impact areas of 
i 
physician behavior. Chapter Six ranks the nine reimbursement systems 
from the standpoint of patient welfare loss and discusses the 
8 
information requirements of each reimbursement system. Chapter Seven 
\ 
concludes with a summary of findings and recommendations. 
CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS 
Since many of the current proposals for health cost containment 
involve a restructuring of the physician-hospital relationship, any 
description of the behavioral impact of physician fee schedules must 
also include an examination of hospital fee schedules. For the 
purpose of this study, a reimbursement system is defined as a 
combination of one physician and one hospital fee schedule. In this 




The first-best solution is used as a standard. This solution 
represents the reimbursement solution that would be imposed by the 
patient on the physician if there were no private information. In 
this situation, the patient pays the physician a prenegotiated sum if 
the physician provides an appropriate level of preventive, diagnostic, 
and treatment services, and nothing if he does not. As with the other 
I 
reimbursement systems to be introduced in this chapter, a mathematical 
formulation of this system will be given in Chapter Five. 
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Fee for Service 
The second reimbursement system is the traditional reimbursement 
mechanism for both physicians and hospitals. Since the physician and 
hospital are paid for services rendered, the fee under this system is 
an increasing function of the complexity and quantity of services 
rendered. For the physician, the fee is determined by market forces. 
For the hospital, the fee represents full cost reimbursement for 
services rendered. In order to understand fee-for-service 
reimbursement, it is helpful to understand the voluntary and therefore 
loosely structured nature of the health care industry in which this 
system evolved. 
Prior to the advent of modern medicine, most hospitals were 
little more than poor houses, places where the indigent ill were sent 
to die (Howard, 1984). These facilities were often operated by 
religious or charitable organizations whose limited resources mandated 
that the physician be privately reimbursed for his services under a 
fee-for-service arrangement. Since the physician was usually the 
only member of the health care team with any medical education, this 
health care system gave the doctor a great deal of autonomy in the 
allocation of the limited and often voluntary health care resources. 
From the beginning, this autonomy was viewed as a prized possession. 
As early as 1880 one finds the American Medical Association resisting 
any and all changes to fee-for-service on the grounds that they would 
infringe on the independence of the physician. Today fee-for-service 
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is still endorsed by the AMA as the most preferred physician 
reimbursement system. 
Capitation Payment 
This third reimbursement system represents the first innovative 
departure from fee-for-service that has been implemented on a national 
basis. Under the capitation payment system, a provider is paid a 
fixed per capita amount irrespective of the services actually rendered 
during a predefined period (such as an enrollment year). One 
organization that has designed its delivery structure around 
capitation payment is the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). 
Gumbiner (1975) defines an HMO as a prepaid group practice in which 
there is a four-way arrangement among the following: 
1. An organized health-care delivery system that includes 
health manpower and facilities capable of providing or 
at least arranging for all of the health services that 
a patient population may require. 
2. An enrolled population consisting of individuals and 
groups of individuals who contract with the delivery 
system for the provision of a range of health services 
for which the organization assumes full responsibility. 
3. A financial plan that incorporates the underwriting of 
the cost of the agreed upon set of services on a 
prenegotiated and prepaid per-person or per-family 
basis. 
4. A management component that assures legal, fiscal, 
public, and professional accountability. (p. 3) 
One of the primary objectives of the health maintenance 
organization is the creation of incentives for the physician to act in 
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the best economic interest of the patient, while still providing high 
quality medical care. one way that HMOs attempt to do this is through 
the elimination of the ineffeciencies caused by the economic 
separation of the physician and hospital. Under fee-for-service the 
physician is able to allocate hospital resources without cost to 
himself, and without effective review by hospital administration. The 
HMO attempts to correct this by making the physician face the cost of 
using hospital resources. 
The concepts underlying the HMO are not new. As early as 1930 
both the Kaiser Health Plan and the Health Insurance Plan of New York 
(HIP} were providing a broad spectrum of health care, including 
hospital services, for a predetermined fixed fee (Brown, 1983, p. 
103). Despite the early successes of these two programs, however, the 
growth of HMOs has been slow (Brown 1983, p. 401). In 1980 only 4.3 
percent of the American population was enrolled in Health Maintenance 
Organizations (Eastaugh, 1981, p. 137). one reason for this slow 
growth was opposition by organized medicine (Feldstein, 1979, p. 295). 
In some parts of the country fee-for-service physicians were 
successful in denying state medical association membership to HMO 
physicians. As state medical association membership is required for 
staff membership in most hospitals, the effect was to deny HMOs access 
to inpatient equipment and facilities. In some states medical 
societies sponsored legislation mandating unrealistic financial 
requirements for the establishment of HMOs, or perverse financial 
incentives (e.g. in Oregon HMOs were required to absorb all losses 
while retaining none of their savings). In other states HMOs were 
declared illegal (Feldstein, 1979, pp. 294-297). 
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The HMO act of 1973 (federal legislation) removed some of the 
legislative barriers to HMO formation previously mandated by state 
law. Unfortunately, it imposed others felt by some to be equally 
burdensome (Brown, 1983, PP• 401-441). One such provision mandates 
that any organization wishing to qualify as a federal HMO must offer 
more extensive benefits than are offered by the majority of third 
party payors. As a larger benefits package raises the premium of the 
HMO in relation to other health insurance premiums, this provision 
places HMOs at a competitive disadvantage. While Congress appears to 
be receptive to legislative suggestions that will make the American 
health care delivery system more competitive, many feel that the 
question "Do HMOs generate real cost savings?" must be resolved before 
additional changes are made to the 1973 act. One problem in answering 
this question is the absence of comparable data bases, (e.g. the 
possible dissimilarity between HMO and other health insurance 
subscriber groups). While per-capita health costs have been shown to 
be lower for HMO participants then for subscriber groups of other 
insurance groups in general (Feldstein, 1979, p. 292), some have 
claimed that HMOs selectively market their plans to healthier 
population groups. A 1980 report from the Health Care Financing 
Administration to the Senate Finance Coumittee reported that eldeflY 
new enrollees in a Seattle HMO were much healthier then the non-HMO 
elderly in the same community. According to Eastaugh (1981, p.135), 
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this adversely affected a national drive by HMOs to improve Medicare 
reimbursement policies. 
There are a number of forms of capitation payment. This study 
will examine three, each of which will be treated as a separate 
reimbursement system. 
Capitation One. In Capitation One, a two person world is assumed 
where one physician contracts with one patient for the provision of 
comprehensive health care services. In return for these services, the 
physician receives a fixed capitation payment from which he must pay 
the hospital the full cost of all hospital services rendered. 
Capitation Two. In Capitation Two, a two person world is also 
assumed. Here the physician contracts with a patient for the 
provision of physician services only. For these services the 
physician receives a fixed capitation payment. The patient, however, 
retains full responsibility for the cost of hospital services 
rendered, reimbursing the hospital directly for these services. 
Capitation Three. In Capitation Three, the hospital is equally 
owned by n physicians where each physician serves one patient. Each 
patient pays a fixed capitation fee from which the physician owners 
first cover the actual hospital costs by contributing equally. Tbe 
I 
residual is kept by each physician as income. 
Diagnostic Related Groups 
The use of Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) reimbursement for the 
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payment of Medicare hospital claims was mandated by Title VI of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1983. Under this reimbursement system, 
patients are assigned according to age, sex, diagnosis, treatment 
procedure and discharge status, to one of 467 presently assigned DRGs. 
Each DRG represents an illness and carries a specific rate of 
reimbursement. If a provider treats a patient for less, it can keep 
the excess. If its costs are more, it must absorb the loss. 
DRG reimbursement is the outgrowth of a federally funded study 
conducted during the 1970s. The objective of this study was to 
develop an alternative to the International Classification of Disease 
Adapted, Eighth Revision (ICDA-8) used to describe patient health 
problems. In attempting to correct this, Yale clinicians combined' the 
ICDA-8 into eighty-three major diagnostic categories (MDCs) in 
accordance with three principles: 
1. The major diagnostic categories were consistent in 
their anatomical, physiopathological classification or 
in the manner in which they were clinically managed. 
2. The major diagnostic categories were large enough 
groups so that they produced statistically meaningful 
patient populations in each category. 
3. The major diagnostic categories covered the range of 
the ICDA--8 codes without overlap (Ernst and Whinney, 
1980, p. 3). 
1 . 
Researchers then obtained a large quantity of patient records 
from New Jersey, Connecticut and South Carolina which were assigned to 
1 This system was later adapted to the newer ICDA-9 classification 
system. 
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the eighty-three MDCs on the basis of primary diagnosis. 
Distributions were then developed, identifying the length of stay for 
each MDC. Through the use of AUTOGRP, an interactive computerized 
grouping algorithm, the clinicians split the eighty-three Mrx:::s into 
groups which: (1) had a sizable number of patients, and (2) explained 
a significant amount of the variance in the distribution of the length 
of stay (Ernst and Whinney, 1980). In the initial study, length of 
stay was used as the dependent variable (i.e. as the surrogate for 
resource consumption). Since researchers still found significant 
variation in the length of stay within each of the subgroups, a second 
"splitting" was done using five additional variables: 
1. Secondary diagnosis 
2. Primary surgical procedure 
3. Secondary surgical procedure 
4. Age 
5. Presence or absence of psychiatric services 
This second split produced 383 diagnostic related groups. In 
subsequent studies, hospital charges were added as a surrogate for 
resource consumption and the number of Diagnostic Related Groups was 
increased to 467 (Ernst and Whinney, 1983). 
During the time that the ICDA-8 study was being conducted, the 
federal budget was rapidly growing as the result of expanding social 
programs and rising hospital costs. In response to pressure from 
Congress, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) began 
studying ways to control medicare reimbursement to hospitals. These 
studies led to the enactment of Section 224 routine cost limits that 
were incorporated into the Medicare reimbursement formula in 1972. 
While these limits tried to control hospital costs for routine 
inpatient care, they did not cover ancillary service utilization or 
costs and did not address the impact of case mix. It was the desire 
to address these issues that led the Health Care Financing 
Administration to study the use of DRGs for reimbursement, a study 
that served as the basis for the Social Security Amendments of 1983. 
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As of the conclusion of this study, DRG reimbursement is still 
being implemented by the Health Care Financing Administration. As the 
concept underlying this reimbursement system is a fairly new 
developnent, changes are still being made and the final form of this 
system is still uncertain. Consequently four possible variations of 
DRG reimbursement are examined by this study. 
DRG One. In DRG One, the physician is paid a fee-for-service, 
while the hospital is reimbursed according to the patient's DRG as 
described above. This is similar to the system originally proposed in 
the Yale University study. 
DRG Two. DRG Two is an amended version of DRG One. Under 
this system the reported physician diagnosis is audited for 
accuracy by a Peer Review Organization (PRO). Since the 
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treated as a separate and distinct reimbursement system. This system 
is similar to that presently mandated by the federal government. 
DRG Three. This reimbursement system was chosen for evaluation 
as it is felt by many to contain a different incentive structure than 
the DRG reimbursement system actually mandated by the federal 
government. Under this system, both the physician and hospital are 
paid according to diagnostic related groups. In 1983 Congress 
directed the Health Care Financing Administration to study the 
possible implementation of this health care reimbursement system. 
DRG Four. This reimbursement system is an amended version of DRG 
Three. Under this system, the reported physician diagnosis is audited 
for accuracy by a Peer Review organization (PRO). Since the 
implementation of an effective audit technology significantly alters 
physician incentives for hospital cost control, this amendment is 
treated as a separate and distinct reimbursement system. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the nine health care reimbursement systems to be 
evaluated in Chapter Five were introduced. These nine systems can be 
grouped into four categories; The First-Best Solution, 
Fee-for-service, Capitation payment, and Diagnostic Related Group 
reimbursement. The first-best solution is not a real world 
reimbursement system but is included for comparison purposes only. 
Fee-for-service is the traditional reimbursement system. While this 
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system is preferred to all other systems by the American Medical 
Association, it is felt by many to contain adverse incentives for 
hospital cost control. Capitation payment is the reimbursement system 
upon which health maintenance organizations are based. While 
empirical studies have indicated that these organizations may provide 
health care at a lower cost than fee-for-service providers, one must 
be careful in drawing conclusions concerning the incentives for cost 
control these organizations invoke as capitation payment subscriber 
groups may demographically differ from those covered by 
fee-for-service reimbursement plans. Three variations of Capitation 
payment are evaluated by this study. DRG reimbursement is currently 
being implemented by the Health Care Financing Administration. As the 
final form of this reimbursement system is still uncertain, four 
possible variations of DRG reimbursement are examined by this study. 
CHAPI'ER III 
DESCRIPTION OF HOSPITAL COST IMPACT 
AREAS OF PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR 
In this chapter the five hospital cost impact areas of physician 
behavior to be examined by this study are introduced. These five 
areas were selected for examination as each is felt to contain 
significant potential for hospital cost savings without an accompany-
ing reduction in the quality of health care. 
Behavioral Areas 
Absence of Provision of Preventive Medicine 
Many critics of the American health care delivery system feel 
that one of its deficiencies is an overemphasis on the treatment of 
disease. According to this, both the patient and the economy would be 
better served if more resources were devoted to the prevention, versus 
the treatment of disease (Eastaugh, 1981, p. 19). An effective 
preventive medicine program consists of two components. One is health 
education which can reduce mortality and morbidity by altering 
non-healthful lifestyles. The other is early diagnosis which can 
increase the chance for survival while reducing treatment costs. 
Conceptually, preventive medicine reduces the probability of illness 
20 
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occurrence and therefore the expected cost of physician and hospital 
services. It is assumed that the provision of preventive medicine is 
beneficial to the patient. An appropriate level of preventive 
medicine is defined as that level which optimizes the benefit to the 
patient. A more fonnal presentation of these concepts is presented in 
Chapter Five. 
Excessive Utilization of Diagnostic 
Ancillary Services 
One of the fastest growing components of health care costs are! 
diagnostic ancillary services. These include those laboratory and 
radiology services that assist the physician in formulating the 
patient diagnosis. While advances in technology have provided the 
physician with a number of valuable diagnostic tools unavailable in 
the past, there is growing concern that many diagnostic procedures are 
being overutilized. Scitovsky (1976) reported that between 1964 and 
1971, laboratory tests per hospital episode increased from 25 to 33 
percent for the simple and well defined diagnostic categories of 
simple appendectomy and acute myocardial infarction, and increased 90 
to 110 percent for perforated appendicitis and breast cancer cases, 
respectively. In a study of 285 hospitals conducted during the period 
i 
of 1968-1971, Redisch (1978) reported that laboratory tests increased 
at an average annual rate of nine percent. According to Eastaugh 
(1981, p. 270), expenditures for laboratory tests and other 
nonpersonal items have the highest rate of increase of any element 
responsible for rising hospital costs. Jonsson and Neuhauser (1975) 
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report that the average American physician orders three times as many 
tests to decide upon a simple elective surgical diagnosis as does a 
comparable Swedish physician. 
A possible reason that physicians overutilize ancillary 
diagnostic services is to supplement or increase their personal 
incomes. Feldstein (1979, p. 176), Reinhart (1973), and Monsma (1970, 
p. 157) all examined the Target Income Hypothesis. According to this, 
the uncertainty that patients have regarding their medical needs 
allows physicians to induce their own demand. The Target Income 
Hypothesis suggests that physicians have control over their own 
markets, and that as the number of physicians in a community increase, 
the number of tests and procedures per outpatient visit also increase. 
Feldstein (1979, p. 167) observes that in West Germany, where the 
physician/patient ratio has increased rapidly in the past decade, 
physician incomes have not decreased but have continued to increase. 
The bulk of this increase is attributed to an increased delivery of 
minor medical x-ray and diagnostic procedures. 
Provision of Excessive Levels of Hospital 
Equipment and Facilities 
Under fee-for-service reimbursement, physician income is a 
function of the complexity of services rendered. Consequently it is 
in the physician's best economic interest to have the hospital where 
! 
he holds medical staff privileges provide as many diagnostic and 
treatment services as possible. Much of the governmentally funded 
regulation activity of the 1970's was aimed at reducing the 
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duplication of hospital equipment and facilities. These included the 
Regional Medical Program and Health Systems Agencies. Most health 
economists feel that these programs were not effective and that the 
provision of excessive levels of hospital equipment and facilities is 
still one of the major areas of cost ineffeciency in the health care 
industry (Eastaugh, 1981, pp. 187 - 205). 
Excessive Lengths of Hospital Stay 
Another way that hospital resources are consumed inefficiently is 
through excessive (non-medically justified) lengths of hospital stay. 
Ideally, hospital length of stay should be a function solely of the 
patient's medical condition. Studies have shown, however, that other 
factors can influence the physician's decision on when to discharge 
the patient. Both Rafferty (1971) and Eastaugh (1981, p. 278), for 
example, have shown that hospital occupancy rates can affect length of 
stay, that as hospital occupancy rates decrease, both the probability 
of hospital admission, and length of hospital stay increase. One 
reason for this physician behavior may be the curtailment of hospital 
services if certain levels of hospital occupancy are not maintained. 
Since the physician's income is a function of the scope of services 
offered by the hospital in which he holds medical staff privileges, it 
is clearly to his advantage to see that his hospital maintains an 
adequate level of patient revenue. Another reason is that the 
physician's charge is often directly related to the number of hospital 
visits. 
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use of Excessive Surgical Services 
The use of excessive surgical services represents another way 
that health care resources may be consumed inefficiently. Monsma 
(1970, p. 149) has shown that the demand for certain surgical 
procedures is directly related to the marginal revenue that the 
physician receives for performing that service. He demonstrates that 
demand will be greater for procedures that require hospitalization 
than for home and office visits, and that the increased demand for 
surgery will be concentrated among those procedures which involve the 
removal of organs which will not greatly impair the functioning of the 
individual, and for which the need for the procedure is subject to 
some doubt. 
In trying to determine the scope of this problem, a number of 
empirical studies have compared surgical utilization under 
fee-for-service and capitation payment physician reimbursement 
programs. In one study conducted by the National Opinion Research 
Center, 400 families covered by two comprehensive insurance groups 
(the one an HMO and the other a traditional fee-for-service insurance 
group) were surveyed. While the study found no significant difference 
between the nonsurgical and nonobstetrical physician visits, the 
enrollees under the HMO had an average of 4.38 hospital surgical 
procedures per hundred persons per year while the enrollees under the 
fee-for-service plan had a rate of 7. 18. The difference of 2. 80 i 
procedures per hundred persons per year was significant at the .9$ 
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confidence level (Monsma, 1970, p. 151). In a second study, Densen 
and associates compared surgical admissions for 50,000 Blue Cross 
subscribers to 50,000 enrollees in Health Insurance Plan of New York. 
For Blue Cross the rate was 5.02 per hundred persons per year, for 
Health Insurance Plan of New York the rate was 4.11. Here again; the 
difference was found to be significant at the .95 confidence level 
(Monsma, 1970, p. 155). 
Lower rates for surgery under fee-for-service reimbursement have 
also been found in other studies. The United Steelworkers of America 
under various negotiated health insurance plans had an average rate of 
hospitalized surgeries of 3.3 per year for members covered by Kaiser 
Foundation Health (a California based HMO} as compared to 6.9 for 
those covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield and 6.3 for those covered by 
commercial insurance. While these studies tend to support the 
hypothesis that the form of physician reimbursement may affect the 
demand for surgery, they must be viewed with caution as the 
populations from which these figures were drawn may not be homogeneous 
(M:>nsma, 1970, P• 156). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the five hospital cost impact areas of physician 
behavior to be examined in this study were introduced. These include 
the provision of preventive medicine, the excessive utilization of 
diagnostic ancillary services, the provision of an excessive level of 
hospital equipment and facilities, excessive lengths of hospital stay 
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and the use of excessive surgical services. This study will now turn 
to the development of the analytical model used in evaluating the 
impact of nine health care reimbursement systems on these five areas 
of physician behavior. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter introduces the traditional agency model, reviewing 
previous applications to both industrial and medical environments. 
Attention is then focused on the development of an "Adverse Selection 
Model - Medical Setting", which is used to evaluate the incentives for 
health cost control embedded within the nine reimbursement systems 
examined by this study. 
Review of Traditional 
Agency Models 
The agency problem is typically modeled in a two-person, single 
period setting. One person, the principal, delegates a decision or 
action to another person, the agent. The action choice determines an 
outcome which affects the welfare of both the principal and the agent. 
The outcome, for example, can be viewed as a monetary reward owned by 
the principal, a portion of which is used to pay the agent for his 
part in determining the outcome. 
Initially, agency research focused on decision-based models. 
Here it was assumed that the agent would select an action e e. E. Tliis 
action with a random state of nature, e E Q, determines the cash 
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outcome x = x( e, 6) , x : X =. R. The principal pays some share, d( x), 
of the outcome to the agent. Accordingly, r(x) = x - d(x), represents 
the principal's residual share. The utility function of the principal 
is denoted by G(r(x)) with G '(.) > 0 and G''(.) ~ o. The agent's 
utility function is H(d(x)) with H'(.) > 0 and H''(.) i o. Both agent 
and principal are assumed to be expected utility maximizers. 
Moreover, if f1(6) and f 2 (6) are subjective probability distribution 
functions held by the principal and agent, it is assumed that 
f 1 <e > = f2 <e > = fCe >. 
In the decision based model it is assumed that each person acts 
in his own interest. It is also assumed that xis the only jointly 
observable outcome and that the contract between the principal and 
agent can be based only upon jointly observable outcomes. 
Furthermore, precontract information is the same for both parties. 
Principal and agent both know E, G( • ) , H( • ) , and Q. 
The problem faced by the principal and agent can now be stated. 
The agent must select the action that maximizes his expected utility 
given the fee schedule. The principal's problem is to select a fee 
schedule so as to maximize expected utility subject to two 
constraints: 
1. The principal must at least pay the agent the agent's 
opportunity cost of joining the firm. The agent will not join the 
firm unless his expected utility is at least as great as his expecbed 
utility from selling his services in the labor market. 
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2. Knowledge that the agent will select the action that 
maximizes the agent's expected utility given the fee schedule. 
In this model, the agent may choose an action different from that 
desired by the principal due to differences in risk attitudes. The 
decision-based model can be expressed as follows: 
Maximize the principal's utility 
Max I G( x-d( x) ) f ( e) 
d(x) E. D 
subject to the minimum utility requirement of the 
agent 
IH(d(x))f(e) > H 
and incentive incompatibility (the selection of the 
argument that maximizes the agent's utility) 
e E argmax IH(d(x) )f( e) 
The next step in agency research involved extending the above 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
model to incorporate the concept of moral hazard. This extended model 
is an effort-based model. The extension defines the action e, as 
productive effort and assumes that H(.) is a function of both d(x) and 
e. A common assumption is H(d(x),e) = U(d(x)) - V(e) where U'(.) > O, 
U''(.)~ O and V'(.) > o. That is, H(.) is separable and the agent is 
strictly risk averse and work averse. For continuous probability 
density functions, the summation would be replaced by integration over 
the relevant domain. 
The problems faced by the principal and agent are the same for: 
the effort-based model as for the decision based model. H:>wever, 
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incentive difficulties in the effort-based model include not only 
different attitudes toward risk but also the fact that the agent 
receives disutility from effort and the principal does not. Since x 
is the only jointly observable variable, an agent can select a lower 
effort level than desired by the principal and blame the poor outcome 
on an unfortunate state of nature. 
Application of Agency Models to 
Industrial Settings 
There have been numerous applications of agency theory to the 
industrial setting. Jensen and Meckling (1976) use agency theory to 
develop a theory of the ownership of the firm. They examine how 
conflicting objectives can be brought into equilibrium through 
employment contracts which tie the interests of managers to the 
interests of owners. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 310), 
"Contractual relations are the essence of the firm", and organizations 
are legal fictions which " ••• serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals." Topics examined by Jensen and 
Meckling include the detennination of the optimal scale of the firm, 
the role of monitoring and bonding activities in reducing agency 
costs, and the detennination of optimal equity to debt ratios. 
Baiman (1982) advocates the use of agency theory as a foundation 
for a nonnative theory of managerial accounting. According to Baiman, 
one reason cost benefit analysis has not been applied to managerial 
accounting is the lack of a well defined and useful model of 
individual behavior within a organization. Agency theory provides 
such a model. Baiman reviews literature that evaluates the value of 
ex post and ex ante information, and compares alternative management 
accounting procedures and systems. 
Shavell (1979) uses agency theory to analyze the impact of 
insurance on individual incentives for loss prevention. In this 
model, the primary problem which the insurance company (principal) 
must resolve is moral hazard, which occurs when insurance policies 
reduce the motivation to "take care" (i.e. the motivation to buy 
locks, buckle seat belts, install smoke detectors etc.). Shavell 
defines a "fully optimal" insurance policy as one where the insurer 
can choose the individual's expenditure on preventive care and the 
terms of the insurance policy (premium and benefits) independently. 
Application of Agency Theory to 
Medical Settings 
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Past applications of agency theory to the health care industry 
have been limited, most of them focusing on the contractual 
relationships and incentives created by heaLth insurance contracts. 
Magee (1977) uses agency theory to evaluate reimbursement contracts 
between hospitals and health insurers. In this model, the insurance 
company is the principal and the hospital administrator is the agen1t. 
As Magee believes that hospital cost escalation is a result of poor 
I 
managerial effeciency, the problem is to select a payment plan that 
will encourage hospital administrators to choose desired actions under 
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conditions of uncertainty. Payment systems evaluated by MaGee include 
payment based on cost reimbursement, payment based on expected costs, 
and payment based on numbers of patients treated. 
In Magee's model, the hospital administrator chooses an action 
vector, a, from the space of available actions. These actions include 
capacity decisions, staffing decisions, financing decisions, as well 
as cost control decisions. The state of nature, s es, includes the 
demand for hospital services, factor input prices, the outcomes of 
cost control projects etc. The hospital's output, x, is a function of 
the administrator's action and the state of nature, x(a,s). This 
action pair also determines the costs incurred by the hospital during 
the period C(a,s). It is assumed that all revenues come from a third 
party. The revenue received from the payer may depend upon the 
action/state pair, as well as the hospital's output as reflected in 
the hospital's revenue function R'(x,a,s) = R'[x(a,s),a,s] = R(a,s). 
The income of the hospital is defined as I(a,s) = R(a,s) - C(a,s). 
Income is uncertain, as it depends upon the probability distribution 
defined over the state space, S, the forms of R(.) and C(.), and the 
actions available. The Magee model assumes that the manager has 
preferences for various levels of income, which are reflected in a 
preference function Uh[I(.)]. Given this notation, the hospital 
administrator's decision problem is to find a*, the solution to 
expression (4) 
Max E Uh[I(a,s)]f(s) (4) 
where f(s) denotes the manager's assessment of the probability that 
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the states will obtain. One problem with Magee's approach is that 
both the patient and physician are omitted from the model. As the 
patient bears the ultimate cost of health care inefficiency, and as 
the physician allocates almost all of the health care inputs charged 
to the patient, this would seem to weaken this model considerably. 
Brown (1979) uses agency theory to analyze the problems of moral 
hazard created by health insurance policies, where moral hazard is 
defined as the reduction in expenditures on preventive medicine and 
the increase in expenditures for non preventive care caused by the 
issuance of a policy. Brown assumes a three person world consisting 
of the patient, the insurer and the physician. For the sake of 
simplicity, hospitals are excluded. The insurer, who is better 
informed about the physician's actions than the patient, is concerned 
about the level of preventive medicine chosen by the patient, and the 
level of effort provided by the physician (at the request of the 
patient). Brown argues that while motivated like any economic man by 
profit, physicians are commonly acting as their patients desire. 
Brown believes that the escalation of hospital costs are the result of 
faulty incentives for the patient to reduce health care costs. 
Brown's model seems to have the same limitations as Magee's. It 
fails to recognize that it is the physician and not the patient who 
selects the majority of health care inputs, that these actions may be 
economically motivated, and that it is the patient and not the 
insurance company that ultimately bears both the risk and cost of 
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inefficiency. 
Adverse Selection Model: 
Medical Setting 
The decision-based or effort-based model has usually been applied 
to production settings where the owner is able to observe only the 
cash outcome. In a medical setting, however, these models are not 
appropriate. In a medical setting the inputs or actions of the 
physician are usually observable, but the information gap of the 
patient makes them difficult to evaluate. Essentially, the physician 
possesses private information. For this reason, any evaluation of 
health care reimbursement systems should include the development of an 
adverse selection agency model. 
In the adverse selection model it is assumed that the principal 
(hereafter called the patient} hires an agent (hereafter called the 
physician} to provide health care inputs. The quantity and mix of 
these health care inputs defines the physician's action,~· This is 
the only jointly observable phenomenon and is the basis for 
contracting between the patient and physician. The formal definition 
of~ is provided later. Since the actions of the physician determine 
virtually all hospital costs, this model treats the physician and 
hospital as a single agent. 
The state of nature, e, is defined as the patient's state of 
health, and n is the set of all of the states of nature. n is 
partitioned into three subsets. The first partition is n1, 
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where e ~ Q1 represents the absence of illness, and illnesses that both 
the physician and patient can identify as not requiring 
hospitalization or surgery for diagnosis or treatment. There is no 
private information (except as to the level of preventive medicine) 
in Ql. The second category is Q 2 , where e e: Q2 represents illnesses 
that the physician can identify as not requiring hospitalization or 
surgery for treatment, but the patient cannot. The third category 
is Q 3, where e E Q 3 represents illnesses requiring hospitalization for 
surgery and treatment. All 8 s are ranked according to severity of 
illness, with the higher 8 s requiring longer treatment than the 
lower e s (i.e. e £ Q 3 represents the most severe illnesses 
while · 8 c Q 1 represents the least severe illnesses) • 
It is assumed that the physician holds medical staff privileges 
in a primary care hospital. A primary care hospital is defined as an 
inpatient facility serving a population base large enough to justify 
the acquisition of noncomplex hospital equipment, but too small to 
fully utilize the more specialized equipnent. A secondary hospital is 
defined as a larger or more specialized facility possessing 
specialized hospital equipment that can be fully utilized, given the 
hospital's larger patient volume. 
The patient's total payment for health care is d(.) = s(.) + 
t(.), wheres(.) is the payment made to the physician and t(.) is the 
payment made to the hospital. The patient's residual wealth, 
therefore, is r(.) = x - d(.), where x represents the patient's gross 
income. 
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The action .§_is defined as a vector of state-specific actions 
~ i = [ ~ il' ~ i2' • • • ~in J ( 5) 
with 
e = ( p, a,, n' W' ,!,) 1 8 = 1 , 2 • • • n 
""'ie 'I' 
( 6) 
The physician's choice is viewed as a three stage process. First the 
physician chooses p at the beginning of the period and then e occurs. 
The physician next chooses a level of a which reveals what 8 occurred 
and, finally chooses n, w, and ij;. A particular ~i reveals the 
physician strategy for all possible occurrences of e. The set Eis 
the collection of all possible physician strategies or actions. The 




If no preventive medicine 
If appropriate level of preventive medicine 
If excessive (non-medically justified) level of diagnostic 
ancillary services 
If appropriate level of diagnostic ancillary services 
If excessive quantity of hospital equipment and facilities 
If appropriate quantity of hospital equipment and facilities 
If excessive length of hospital stay 
If appropriate length of hospital stay 
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If excessive level of surgical services 
If appropriate level of surgical services 
For each action component other than p, appropriate level is 
defined as the minimum level necessary to restore the patient to 
health. H'.>wever, the definition of appropriate level for preventive 
medicine needs some further elaboration. 
There are two key issues regarding appropriate preventive 
medicine. One is the concept of a proper quantity and the other is 
the assumption that the proper quantity is cost-beneficial to the 
patient. For simplicity it is assumed that preventive is either 
applied at the correct level or that it is not applied at all. With 
this assumption, the notion of patient benefit can be formally defined 
as follows: 
Let POi and Pli represent the probability of ei in the absence 
and presence respectively of preventive medicine. As mentioned in an 
earlier context, the application of preventive medicine increases the 
likelihood of e. and decreases the likelihood of all other e• Thus 
1 
pll > POI and Pli < POi' i = 2 n. A nonpecuniary benefit of 
preventive medicine is an increased likelihood of health. But a key 
assumption is that the expected cost to the patient for an action with 
i 
p = 1 is less than the expected cost of the same action with p = o. 
Let d(e,e = s(e,e ) + t(e,e ), p = O, 1 and 8 = 1, 2 ••• n. 
-pe -pe -pe 
Also lets = fp s(e,~ ) and t = ~ t(p,~ ),p = 0, 1. Assuming 
P 8=1 p8 p8 p @=l p8 p8 
~ 
an economic benefit is equivalent to assuming thats + t < s 0 + t. 1 1 0 
In addition to the usual assumptions, the following assumptions a~e 
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made: 
1. All illnesses are treatable and curable by the end of the 
period. 
2. Death is not a state of nature. 1 
3. There is a finite number of illnesses. 
4. The more severe the illness, the lower the probability of 
its occurrence. 
5. The provision of preventive medicine decreases the 
probability of every illness during the period (this is referred to as 
the probability revision assumption). 
6. The physician can always identify the true state of 
nature, 8, and is qualified to treat all illnesses. 
7. Hospitals have no source of funds other than patient revenue 
and cannot therefore provide preventive, diagnostic or treatment 
services unless hospital reimbursement is at least at a level that 
covers costs (this is referred to as the actual cost reimbursement 
assumption). 
a. In all reimbursement systems, hospital costs are a function 
1 For the purpose of simplification, this model is only concerned! 
with those illnesses that can be cured, and do not result in the deaFh 
of the patient. Any conclusions of this study, therefore, are subject 
to this limitation. 
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of the volume and complexity of hospital services rendered (this is 
referred to as the hospital volume/complexity assumption). 
9. In all reimbursement systems but Capitation Payment, 
physician charges are a function of the volume and complexity of 
physician services rendered (this is referred to as the physician 
volume - complexity assumption). 
10. The physician will always provide at least the minimum level 
of a. , n, w and 1/; necessary to cure the patient. In addition, the 
physician will never provide an excessive level of a.,n,w or 1/; if the 
provision of such services would harm the patient (this is referred to 
as the minimum ethics assumption). 
11. Whenever a physician is faced with two or more actions, both 
of which have equal benefit to the physician, but one of which 
benefits the patient more than the other, the physician will choose 
that action that benefits the patient most (this is referred to as the 
non perverse-behavior assumption). 2 
The patient has nine reimbursement systems to evaluate. It is 
assumed that the physician is risk averse. 3 Given this assumption, 
2 A complete listing of all assumptions of the model are given in 
Appendix A. 
3 For increasing utility functions, a decision maker is assumed to 
be risk averse if and only if his certainty equivalent for any non 
degenerate lottery is less than the expected consequence of that 
lottery. In the Adverse Selection Model - Medical Setting, this means .,. 
that H < H. 
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and the above development, the patient's problem can be expressed as 
follows 




W(s( .) )f( 8) > H ( 8) 
E(H(s(.}) I ~*, s(.}) > E(H(s(.))j ~,s(.)) (9) 
for all ~ e E and ~ * ~* 
where~* is the optimal action from the standpoint of the physician. 
Of the nine reimbursement systems, the patient will choose the 
one which maximizes his expected residual wealth subject to (8), a 
constraint requiring a minimum payment to the physician and (9), the 
notion that the physician will choose an action that maximizes his 
expected utility for a given reimbursement system. Notice that this 
model will evaluate the nine reimbursement systems but that it will 
not attempt to explicitly identify a second best solution (i.e. the 
optimal reimbursement system in the presence of private information). 
The arguments of s(.) and d(.) are left unspecified. The reason 
for this is that the nine systems differ in specifying the contracting 
variable. Generally, ~is the contracting variable between the 
patient and physician, although t(.) is at times based on the 
declared by the physician. 
The evaluation of the nine systems will proceed in two steps. i 
First, for a given reimbursement system the resulting optimal action 
choice of the physician is identified. This action choice analysis is 
presented in Chapter Five. Second, given the action choices of the 
physician for each reimbursement system, the effect on the objective 
function is determined. This welfare measure of the patient is used 
to evaluate the nine systems. This analysis appears in Chapter Six. 
41 
A significant difference in the above model that will affect 
subsequent analysis is the allowance of private information. 
Specifically, the physician knows the actual e and the appropriate 
action associated with the actual e. The patient knows the action 
taken but cannot evaluate the action as to its propriety. Because of 
this the physician can declare a e different from the actual e and may 
choose an inappropriate action for the actual e (although it may seem 
appropriate for the declared e). This capacity creates a special 
contracting problem for the patient, referred to as adverse selection. 
Clearly, the patient must attempt to identify a reimbursement syst~m 
that discourages the misuse of private information. 
Summary 
While the applications of agency theory to industrial settings 
are numerous, the use of this analytical model in the health care 
industry has been more limited. Agency theory has been used to study 
the impact of health insurance on incentives for cost control. Inlall 
of the studies evaluated, however, the focus for this control has feen 
on the patient, the hospital administrator or the third party payer 
rather than on the physician. Since the physician is responsible for 
seventy-five to eighty percent of the cost of all health care inputs, 
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and since he possesses superior information that may allow him to 
select combinations of inputs that are not in the best interest of the 
patient, previous agency theory models may not be entirely 
appropriate. In this chapter the an adverse selection model was 
introduced. This model is designed specifically for the health care 
field and is the model that will be used to evaluate the nine health 
care reimbursement systems. 
CHAPl'ER V 
PHYSICIAN ACTION CHOICE 
AN AGENCY ANALYSIS 
In this chapter the physician incentives for cost control 
embedded within each of the nine health care reimbursement systems are 
analyzed. In each system it will be assumed that the patient hires a 
physician to provide preventive, diagnostic and treatment services. 
The patient's gross payment for these services will be defined as d(.) 
= s(.) + t(.), wheres(.) represents the patient's payment to the 
physician, and t(.) represents the patient's payment to the hospital. 
By assumption, the patient's payment to the hospital is the actual 
cost incurred by the hospital. 
First-Best Solution 
The first-best solution represents the reimbursement system that 
would be imposed by the patient on the physician if there is no 
private information. Here the patient knows the state of nature, e, 
and the appropriate action. From the patient's standpoint, the 
optimal action is e = ( e I' e 2 • • • e ) where e = ( 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ) - a - a - a ' tln - ae 
for all e. Since the patient can observe and evaluate ~ and e, the' 
" minimum payment required to achieve e is t(e,~) + H, where t( e,~) 
a a a 
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"' is the actual hospital cost of an appropriate action, and His the 
minimum cash payment required to obtain the services of the physician 
(i.e. the certainty equivalent of H). In the first-best solution, 
the physician's payment 
• = r: if e = g a if ~ + e -a ( 10) ( 11 ) 
A 
forces e. The actual payment for a given 8 is d = H + t( e,e ), and 
-a -a 
.I\ 
the expected payment is H + t, where t is the expected hospital 
a a 
payment for the appropriate action vector. The patient's welfare 
,._ A 
measure is x - H - t, and H + t defines the welfare loss of health a a 
care in the absence of private information. 
Define ~k = (~kl' ~kZ' ••• ~kn) where ~i= (0,1,1,1,1); 
Since no private information exists and actions are observable, the 
patient could force ~k by setting 
s = {; if .§ = 





In this case the actual payment for a given 8 is d = H + t( e,gk) and 
.I\ 
the expected payment ~s H + tk. However, by the definition of 
""' " preventive medicine given in Chapter Four, H + ta < H + tk which 
implies ta< tk. That is, for the first-best solution if preventive 
medicine is cost-beneficial, it must all come from a reduction in the 
I 
expected hospital cost. 
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Fee-for-Service 
In a fee-for-service reimbursement system the patient makes a 
gross payment, d(6,~) = s(e,~i) + t(e,~i) which the provider accepts 
as reimbursement for specific preventive, diagnostic, and treatment 
services for a specific e. It is assumed thats(.) is made directly 
to the physician, and that t(.) is made directly to the hospital. It 
is also assumed that there are n states of nature and m action 
choices. 
Let e = (e , e , ••• e ) be the ith action, where e is the ,_ e -n -i2 -in :i.. e 
specific action associated with the state of nature, e. Thus the 
specific action ~e determines d(e,~i~' and consequently the 
component reimbursement schedules s(e,e) and t(e,e ). 
-i6 -ie 
Proposition 1: In _fee-for-service, the physician's optimal action 
corresponds to one of the following two actions: 
e = (e ' e ' ... ~ ) -f -fl -f2 fn (14) 
e = (e ' e ' ... !. g -gl -g2 gn ( 15) 
and 
i(p,1,1,1,1) if e E:: nl 
e = Cp,o,o,o,o> if ee n2 -ei 




where i = f if p = O and i = g if p = 1, respectively. 
Proof: Partition the set of specific action choices so that: 
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First consider E0 • If 8 E n1 occurs, then the only physician 
involvement is P• All other components are chosen correctly by 
default. Thus define e = (0,1,1,1,1) for 8 E Q • This implies , 
~l 1 
e is the first component of all e fanned from E. Let -n -i o 
e = (0,0,0,0,0),8 e n2 • By the physician volume-complexity -fe 
Next consider 
~is' 8 e. n3 By the minimum ethics assumption~= 1 must occur fdr 
all e ,8 6- n . Define e = (0,0,0,0,1), 8 e. n3• Again, by the -i8 3 -fe 
Physician volume-complexity assumptions( 8,ef) > s( 8,e . 8), - 8 -1 
i =#= f , for e e. n • 
3 
Consequently, ~ f dominates all feasible 
formed from e € E0 • -is 
Finally, consider ~ iS E: E 1• By similar argmnent, g g dominates 
all other~ fanned from ~iS e E1. Since any ~i must have 
either p = O or p = 1, the physician's choice is narrowed to ~f 
and e. Q.E.D. 
-g 
Analysis of Physicians Action 
Choice Fee-for-Service 
Since the greatest benefit accrues to the patient through the 
selection of action choice e (previously defined), the 
-a 
fee-for-service reimbursement system clearly does not provide an 
incentive for the physician to select those inputs that will maximiie 
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the welfare of the patient. Insight as to why this occurs under the 
fee-for-service reimbursement system is given below. 
Provision of Preventive Medicine: If one defines 
s(8,~) = s(8,~f) + z(p) (21) 
where z(p) equals the payment to the physician for preventive medicine 
services under fee-for-service reimbursement, then the following 
corollary can be stated: 
Corollary 1A: Under fee-for-service reimbursement, a risk-neutral 
physician will provide preventive medicine if and only if 
z(p) - t:CP - P )s(8,e) > 0 
08 18 -£8 
Proof: 
Necessary Condition: Suppose a physician is risk neutral. A 
Physician will choose e if -g 
E(s(8,e )) > E(s(8,!!k,)) 
-g .L 
By equation (21), 
E(s(8,e )) = E(s(8,~) + E(z(p)) 
-g .L 
E(s(8,~g>> = t:P18Cs(8,~f>> + z(p) 
Substituting (25) into (23), 
IP (s( 8,ef)) + z(p) > E(s( 8,~f)) 
18 -
z(p) + t:P18(s( 8,~f)) > t:P 08(s( 8,~f) 










Suppose that equation (22) is true (i.e. that the amount that a 
physician will receive for providing preventive medicine at the 
beginning of the period is greater than the expected value of the 
payment for diagnostic and treatment services that he will lose by 
providing preventive medicine at the beginning of the period). 
z(p) - I (P 
08 
-P )s(9,e) > o 
18 -f c2, > 
z(p) - z;P (s(9 ,e )) + z:P (s( 8 ,e )) > 0 (30) 08 -f 18 r 
z(p) + IP (s(9 ,e )) > z:P Csc 8 ,e )) (31) 18 -f 08 -f 
E ( s Ca.g )) > E ( s ( ~f )) (32) 
Equation 32 implies a risk-neutral physician will provide preventive 
medicine. 
In deciding upon the provision of preventive medicine services, 
the physician will be influenced by the price that he can charge for 
those services, and the impact of those services on future treatment 
revenues. If the price that the physician can charge for those 
services is lower than the price he can charge for treatment services, 
or if the provision of preventive medicine will reduce the expected 
future revenues for treatment revenues by an amount that is greater 
than the payment he will receive for providing preventive medicine 
services, then it will be to the physician's economic interest to 
build a medical practice that emphasizes the treatment, rather than 
the prevention of disease. 
In the current health care market, the charge for most preventfve 
I 
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services is lower than that which can be generated through the 
diagnosis and treatment of disease. In addition, the provision of 
preventive medicine can significantly reduce the cost of health care 
through a reduction in morbidity and mortality rates. Consequently 
the provision of large amounts of preventive medicine is not in the 
best economic interest of the physician. One of the justifications 
given for the establishment of the governmentally funded public health 
service was the disinterest of the private medical sector in the 
provision of preventive medicine. Given the incentive structure of 
the fee-for-service reimbursement system, the reasons for this 
disinterest are clearly evident. 
Utilization of Diagnostic Ancillary Services: The ability of the 
physician to enhance his income by ordering excessive inputs is 
constrained by two factors: (1) a set of professional ethics which 
dictate that the physician will not take an action that will harm the 
patient (the minimum ethics assumption) and (2) the fear of detection 
(i.e. providing an incorrect diagnosis or treatment that the patient 
then determines is wrong). Few diagnostic procedures are potentially 
harmful to the patient. Should the physician overutilize these 
procedures, the probability of detection is small as the patient would 
not present himself to the physician if he did not feel that he was in 
need of some kind of diagnostic service, and few if any patients seek 
a second medical opinion regarding the need for diagnostic procedures. 
Since physician income increases with the volume and complexity 
of services rendered, a physician working under fee-for-service will 
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have an economic incentive to choose an excessive level of diagnostic 
services. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Reinhart 
(1973) reviewed earlier in this proposal, and with those of Maloney 
and Rogers (1979) who have demonstrated that diagnostic ancillary 
tests are a major source of unnecessary costs. 
Duplication of Hospital Equipment and Facilities: In 
fee-for-service, inappropriate levels of hospitalization dominate 
appropriate levels. Since physician income is a function of the 
complexity of services rendered, it is in the physician's best 
economic interest to have the hospital where he holds medical staff 
privileges provide as many diagnostic and treatment services as 
possible. If the physician's marginal revenue was impacted by the 
cost of specialized hospital equipment, the acquisition of such 
equipment would be restricted to those items for which there was a 
large enough patient volume to reasonably amortize acquisition and 
operating costs. Since it is the hospital, and not the physician 
that pays the fixed costs of such equipment, and since hospitals under 
fee-for-service are able to pass these costs directly to the patient, 
excessive levels of hospital equipment and facilities dominate 
appropriate levels. 
Length of Hospital Stay: Since the fee the physician charges is 
often correlated with the length of hospital stay, and since 
physicians are susceptable to pressures to maintain that level of 
hospital occupancy required to support those services deemed necessi;iry 
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for the maximization of personal income, the fee-for-service physician 
has an incentive to order excessive lengths of hospital stay. 
Use of Surgical Services: Since physician income is a function 
of the volmne and complexity of services provided, the provision of an 
excessive level of surgical services provides greater revenue than the 
provision of an appropriate level. As was mentioned earlier, however, 
the ability of the physician to enhance his income by ordering 
excessive input is constrained by two factors: (1) a set of 
professional ethics which dictate that the physician will not take an 
action that will harm the patient, and (2) the fear of detection. 
Since non-medically justified surgery in the presence of serious 
illness would be health threatening (or even life threatening), and 
since the probability of the patient detecting an incorrect or 
excessive diagnosis or treatment increases as the severity of illness 
increases (due to the greater probability that the patient will seek a 
second medical opinion), unnecessary surgery in fee-for-service is 
most likely to occur when 8 € Q2 (i.e. a non-serious illness where the 
patient is unable to evaluate the need for surgery). This is 
consistent with the findings of Monsma (1970, P• 149) that 
non-medically justified surgery is concentrated among those procedures 
which will not greatly impair the functioning of the individual, an~ 
for which the need for the procedure is subject to some doubt. 
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Capitation-One 
In Capitation-One the patient pays the physician a prenegotiated 
amount Q*, which remains fixed for the contract period regardless of 
the services actually rendered by the physician and hospital. In 
calculating this fixed payment, Q* is chosen such that 
IP H(Q - t(e,e} = H (33} 
18 -a. 
Where the solution to the equation (33} is defined as Q*• In 
Capitation-One it is assumed that Q* is paid directly to the 
physician, who in turn makes a payment to the hospital of t(e,~.>· 
1 
The physician's income is therefore the residual defined by 
s(e,_e.} = Q* - t(8,e.). Given this background, the following 
1 -1 
proposition can be stated. 
Proposition 2: Given Q*, a Capitation-One physician will choose e. -a 
~: Let E 1 = f ~ I p = 1} and E O = [ ~ I p = O} • Choose 
e e E where i + a. For any i + a, excessive services are provided 
-i 1 
implying t. > t. But if this occurs the physician's income would 
1 a 
A 
drop below H and therefore he would not choose ~ i ,\,: e • -a For ~ iE. E O' 
the choice of any i =I k also implies that ti > tk. So i t- k would 
not be chosen. Now tk > ta by definition of the cost-benefit nature 
of preventive medicine, and so choice of ~k would also result in a 
"' physician income below H. Thus~ 
choice for the physician, ~.E.o. 
= e is the only feasible action -a 
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Capitation-Two 
In Capitation-Two the physician contracts with the 
patient for the provision of physician services only. The patient 
A . 
pays the physician a lmnp sum, s = H, which remains fixed for the 
period regardless of the physician services rendered. The patient 
pays the hospital t(8,~i) which represents full reimbursement of the 
cost of hospital services rendered. For a contract year, the actual 
A 
payment for health care, therefore, is d = H + t( e,!! i) and 
A 
the expected payment is E(d) = H + t 1 Given this background, 
the following proposition can be stated: 




Proof: Since the physician is paid s = H regardless of the action 
vector chosen, by the non-perverse behavior assmnption the physician 
will choose the action vector which benefits the patient most, which 
has been shown to bee. 
-a 
Capitation-Three 
In Capitation-Three, the ability of a hospital to serve more than 
' one physician produces a different capitation payment for the patient. 
Consider none patient 
of serving n patients. 
one physician models with a hospital capablk 
Also assume that the hospital is owned by thb 
n physicians. Each physician contracts with his patient for a fixed 
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payment. From this fixed payment the physician pays the hospital, and 
keeps the residual. Because of diversification, the amount each 
physician must pay the hospital is determinable. 
Let tJ e,~} be the actual cost function for physician i • 
.... 
Assume that t is independent, identically distributed for 
i 
i = 1, 2, ••• n. 1 Thus the total hospital cost for c;:apitation-Three 
can be expressed as: 
N 





and the average cost per patient is 
-- "" - ....... -C, /n = A = ( t1 + t 2 + • • • tn) /n 





. :2.· -= rvar(t. )/n = Var(t )/n 
l. a 







-Accordingly, Capitation-Three diversifies away the variability int. a 
Since the size of n required to achieve the benefits of 
diversification is an empirical issue, it will simply be assumed that 
2 
diversification is a practical possibility. Diversification implies 
-t 
1 
being independent and identically distributed implies - -= ••• =t =t. n a 
2 In portfolio theory it has been shown that the security specific 
risk can be eliminated when n-+ oo where n is the number of securities 
in a portfolio. In practical terms, empirical studies have shown that 
n::::: 16 is large enough to achieve the benefits of diversification. 
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that a hospital can be paid t by each patient, and as a result recover 
a 
its actual operating costs. 
For a physician to agree to employment in Capitation-Three, he 
;,. 
must receive H (i.e. the market-set minimum salary). Now define the 
.,. 
capitation payment to bed= H + t. Since at the end of the period a 
each physician will be paid 1/n of the total capitation payment less 
the total actual hospital cost, each physician in Capitation-Three 
,.. 
should receive H (provided of course that physician behavior is such 
that the actual hospital cost is no more than t ). But the physician 
a 
has an incentive to see that hospital costs are appropriate as the 
following proposition will establish: 
Proposition 4: Given Q*, a Capitation-Three physician will choose ~a" 
' 
Proof: Let E1 = [~ I p = 11 and Eo = [~ I P = oJ. Choose 
~i E...E 1 where i 1 a. For any i • a, excessive services are provided 
implying ti > ta" But if this occurs the physician's salary would · 
~ 
drop below H and therefore he would not choose ~ i + ~ a• For ~ i E.. E O 
the choice of any i ~ k also implies that ti> "tit· Soi* k would 
not be chosen. Now~> ta by definition of· the cost-benefit nature 
of preventive medicine, and so choice of ek would also result in a 
A 
physician salary below H. Thus ~a is the only feasible action 
choice for the physician. 
Al though reservations have been expressed previously concernin1g 
previous studies that have compared fee-for-service reimbursement tp 
I 
capitation payment, the above findings are consistent with empirical 
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studies evaluating the operational performance of Health Maintenance 
Organizations. Eastaugh (1981, p. 142) reports that in a comparison 
of HMOs to fee-for-service, that HMOs achieve a ten to thirty percent 
cost savings through the lower utilization of hospital equipment and 
facilities. In a study conducted by Feldstein (1979), hospital days 
per year per 1000 population were shown to be 552 for HMO patients as 
compared to 1155 for fee-for-service patients. The same study 
indicated significantly lower HMO surgical rates for minor surgical 
procedures. The rates for tonsillectomies, for example, was shown to 
be one third to one half lower for HMO enrollees than for 
fee-for-service patients. 
DRG-One 
In DRG-one, the patient makes a payment d(8,e.) which the health 
"""1 
care providers accept as full reimbursement for specific preventive, 
diagnostic and treatment services for a specific e. In this model~ e 
represents the true diagnosis, while e represents the diagnosis 
declared by the physician, which may or may not be the same as the 
true diagnosis. In DRG-One, payment is based upon the declared 
diagnosis. It is assumed that d(8,~.) is paid to the physician, who 
1 
pays the hospital t(e,~) and retains s(e,~i). For the physician, 
s(e,~.) is a function of the volume and complexity of physician 
1 
services actually provided. For the hospital, t(e,e) is a fixed 
-i 
amount that is paid upon the declaration of e, regardless of the 
volume and quantity of hospital services actually provided. There is 
one and only one lump sum hospital payment, t( 6,e ), for each 
-i 
declared state of illness, e. This fixed amount represents the 
hospital cost for the action vector i=ke = (0,1,1,1,1) for all e. 
DRG-One, therefore, provides full hospital reimbursement for 
appropriate levels of all hospital inputs but preventive medicine. 
It provides no hospital reimbursement for preventive medicine. 
A possible reason that DRG-one fails to provide full hospital 
reimbursement for an appropriate level of preventive medicine is 
that the provision of preventive medicine is not 6 dependent and it 
is difficult, therefore, for anyone but the physician to know what 
the appropriate level is. For diagnostic and treatment services, 
appropriate levels of service are defined as those that restore the 
patient to a state of health at the lowest possible cost. This 
criterion is useless for preventive medicine as the patient may 
already be well, arid even if he is not, the provision of these 
services will not restore the patient to health but will merely 
reduce the probability that he will acquire additional illnesses. 
With no criterion for the definition of an appropriate level of 
preventive medicine, the designers of this reimbursement system 
excluded hospital payment for this service. Since the DRG-One 
physician is still under fee-for-service, he could choose to provide 
(and be paid for) an appropriate level of preventive medicine. 
Unfortunately, however, preventive medicine requires some hospital 
services, which would not be paid for. Thus, by the actual cost 
reimbursement assumption, a DRG-one physician will not provide 
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preventive medicine. Accordingly, in determining the optimal 
physician action, one must restrict attention to~ EE where 
Ea = r~ I P = 0 J • The following proposition identifies the optimal 
physician action choice for a DRG reimbursement system. 
Proposition 5: In DRG-One, the physician's action choice will be 




(0,1,1,1,1) if e e Q - S12 
e = 
-he co,o,o,o,o> if e e S12 
(40) 
(41) 
Proof: Fore= e1 , ~hl = (0,1,1,1,1) by default. Foree S13, the 
physician will choose 1/J = 1 by the minimum ethics assumption, and 
must, consequently, disclose e = e. Since the true e has been 
revealed by the physician, the hospital will be reimbursed only for 
the cost of an appropriate level of care fore. Thus by the actual 
cost reimbursement assumption, the physician must also 
set a= n = w = 1. Hence ~he = (0,1,1,1,1) for e e Q-Q2• 
Now consider e E: S12 • Here a physician can declare e > e and 
not threaten the well being of the patient. By the physician volume 
- complexity assumption, the "appropriate" action fore will yield a 
higher payoff to the physician than that associated with e, and will 
simultaneously reimburse the hospital for the actual costs associated 
with e. Moreover, an appropriate action fore is inappropriate 
fore. Thus, ~he= co,o,o,o,o) fore e S12 • Q.E.o. 
59 
While DRG-One reimbursement is new enough that there are still 
no empirical studies on the impact of this system on physician 
behavior, the above findings seem consistent with the activities of 
the health care industry during the first year of implementation. A 
survey by this author of American Hospital Association literature 
indicates that significant attention is being given to the training 
of physicians in techniques that can be used to increase the severity 
of declared diagnoses. In addition, a recent interview with the 
manager of Ernst and Whinney responsible for health care custome~s in 
Oklahoma, reveals that while some hospitals have attempted to 
implement DRG cost accounting packages that will assist with cost 
control, the greatest demand is for software packages that identify 
on a case by case basis the most costly billable diagnoses (Powell, 
1984). 
DRG-Two 
Because Congress is concerned about the potential for 
inappropriate diagnostic coding, it has called for the establishltlent 
of Peer Review organizations (PROs) whose purpose will be to audit 
medical records to verify diagnostic accuracy (Ernst and Whinney, 
1983). Since the presence of an audit function will alter physi~ian 
incentives for hospital cost control, this addition is significant 
enough to warrant analysis as a new and separate health care 
reimbursement system. This system is simply DRG-One with an audit. 
The principal purpose of the audit is to reveal whether the declared 
corresponds to the actual e. It is assumed that the audit technology 
I 
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exists to reveal the true e. The effect of an audit on physician 
behavior is revealed by the following proposition: 
Proposition 6: In DRG-Two, the physician's action choice will be 9-{" 
Proof: By Proposition 5 an audit is only required fore E: r.i2• An 
audit occurs after the provision of treatment but before 
payment is made to the physician and hospital. The audit can, 
therefore, affect the amount paid to the hospital. The audit will 
reveal the true 8, and the hospital will receive a payment based on 
an appropriate level of care for the true ~ By the actual cost 
reimbursement assumption the physician cannot take any action that 
will result in less than full cost reimbursement to the hospital. To 
do so would result in the insolvency of the hospital and the loss qf 
its services by the physician. Since the physician's income is a 
function of the complexity of volume of services rendered, both of 
which are hospital dependent, the loss of hospital services would in 
turn result in a reduction of physician income. Consequently, the 
physician, anticipating an audit, must choose ~ke = (0,1,1,1,1) 
DRG-Three 
In DRG-Three the patient makes a gross payment of 
d( e,~i) = s( 8,!i> + t( 6,!i>' where s( 6,~i) represents the payment tp 
the physician, and t(e,e.) represents the payment to the hospital. 
-i. 
In DRG-Three, t(8,!i) is the hospital's cost of the action vector 
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~ke = (0,1,1,1,1) appropriate toe, and s(e,~i) represents physician 
reimbursement for the selection of diagnostic and treatment services 
appropriate toe. Given this notation, the following proposition can 
be stated: 
Proposition 7: In DRG-Three, the physician's action choice will be 
Proof: Fore E Q1 , the only physician involvement is p, all other 
action components are chosen correctly by default. Since DRG-Three 
makes no provision for the payment of preventive medicine, the 
physician will choose~ = (0,1,1,1,1). Now examine e e Q3 • By 
the minimum ethics assumption the physician will choose~= 1. Since 
DRG-Three reveals the appropriate level of hospital reimbursement for 
each e, the physician will declare 8 = 8 to obtain adequate 
reimbursement. Since the hospital cost of inappropriate or 
excessive levels of care exceeds the cost of an appropriate level of 
care, and since the actual cost reimbursement assumption dictates 
that the hospital cannot provide services unless its reimbursement is 
at least equal to cost, the physician must qhoose a,n,w and~= 1. 
Consequently for e ~ Q3 , the physician's action choice will be 
~he= (0,1,1,1,1). Finally consider 8 £ Qz• Define 
e = co,o,o,o,o). -~ Since s(e,eh) is greater than all other - u 
s(e,e ), e * u, the physician will be motivated to choose 
·h 
inappropriate levels of a,n,w and~ if he can solve the hospital 
reimbursement problem. Since an inappropriate level of care for 
one e, may be appropriate for a higher level of e, in e E Q2 , the 
physician will declare 8 > 8 and choose ~he = (O,O,O,O,O). 
DRG-Four 
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DRG-Four is identical to DRG-Three, except that all declarations 
of e in e ~ Q2are audited by a Peer Review organization. Given this 
background, the following proposition can be stated: 
Proposition 8: In DRG-Four, the physician's action choice will be ~k· 
Proof: Since DRG-Four provides no physician reimbursement for the 
provision of preventive medicine, the physician's optimal choice for 
this action component is p = 0 for all e. Now examine the physician• s 
selection for the other action components. In e E:. Q1, the physician's 
action choice for a,n,w and~ are chosen correctly by default. Hence 
~ke = (0,1,1,1,1) fore~ Q1• For all other components the audit will 
force the physician to choose the true e. Here, however, the 
incentive is direct as the physician's payment is directly dependent 
upon e. 
Conclusion 
Chapter Five used the Adverse Selection - Medical Setting Model 
to reveal physician action choices under differing health 
reimbursement systems. The nine systems evaluated yielded five action 
choices, e, ef' e, eh and e_k. Each of these action choices was -a - -g -
defined and explained in this chapter. In Chapter Six, these five 
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action choices are used to rank the health care reimbursement systems 
from the standpoint of patient welfare. 
CHAPTER VI 
COMPARISON OF HEALTH CARE 
REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS 
In this chapter six existing or proposed health care 
reimbursement systems are evaluated. The standard for evaluation is 
the welfare a patient would receive from the first-best solution. 
Physician risk-aversion is first assumed. This condition is then 
relaxed and a ranking is provided for physician risk-neutrality. 
Since fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement do not provide the 
incentives for the physician to select the action vector most 
appropriate to the patient, this chapter concludes with an examination 
of the private information disclosure requirements that have been made 
in an attempt to enable the patient to write a better contract. 
System Ranking 
Physician Risk-Aversion 
In Chapter Four the patient's utility was defined as G(x-d(.)). 
In all of the analysis it is assumed that G(x-d(.)) = x - d(.). 
A risk-neutral patient will maximize this utility through the 
selection of the reimbursement system with the lowest d(.), where 
d(.) is defined as the patient welfare loss. In the first-best 
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solution the actual payment for a particular state of nature is 
~ A 
d = H + t(8,~) and the expected payment is E(d) = H + t. Since dis a a 
the minimum payment required to restore a patient to a state of 
health, the first-best solution is a standard by which the other eight 
reimbursement systems can be evaluated. 
It has previously been shown that changing the physician payment 
component of DRG reimbursement does not alter the physician action 
choice. That is, the physician action choice in DRG-One is the same 
as in DRG-Three, and the physician action choice in DRG-Two is the 
same as in DRG-Four. Furthermore, the cost of each action choice is 
the same. Consequently, only DRG-One and DRG-Two will be discussed in 
this chapter. 
The welfare measure for a risk-neutral patient is E(x) - E(d) = 
x d. calculating d will therefore provide a measure by which each 
reimbursement system can be evaluated. As indicated, if no private 
I\ 
information exists then d = H + t is the lowest possible welfare 
a 
loss. Furthermore, paying d insures the action e. Thus the 
-a 
" first-best solution is formally defined as the pair (H + t , e ) • a -a 
If a reimbursement system can induce e for the same cost, then the -a 
private information of the physician will not adversely affect the 
patient. 
Of the six proposed or existing systems evaluated in this 
chapter, both Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three are able to achieve 
,. 
e at an expected cost equal to H + t. These two systems actually -a a 
duplicate the first-best solution. Thus both reimbursement systems 
can be fully endorsed theoretically as they achieve the appropriate 
physician action at the lowest possible cost. 
Now consider Capitation-One. Here dis chosen so that 
EP18H(d - t(e,~a) = H, and the physician payment is defined by 
s = d - t( e ,e) where e = e • Let s = rs ( e ,e )P • Since 
c - - -a c c a 18 
H < s (Kenney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 149), H + t < s 
c a c 
-+ t for 
a 
strict risk-aversion, and both Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three 
dominate Capitation-one. 
It can also be shown that Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three 
dominate the fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement systems. For 
fee-for-service, s(e,~) + t(e,e) < s(e,e) + t(e,e) < s(e,ef) a -a -g -g -
+ t( 8 , ~f ) with strict inequalities holding for at least one e. 
Thus sa +ta< sg + tg <sf+ tf. Consequently, fee-for-service is 
more costly to the patient than either Capitation-Two or 
capitation-Three. 
As previously mentioned, for DRG models only DRG-One and 
DRG-Two are evaluated since the action choices and costs are 
identical to DRG-Three and DRG-Four, respectively. First consider 
DRG-Two. Here the action choice is ~k and the expected cost is 
-sk + tk + A, where A is the audit cost. But s + t > s + t 
k k a a 
because of the cost-benefit definition of preventive medicine. 
Clearly, Capitation-Two and Therefore sk +~+A> sa + ta 
capitation-Three both dominate DRG-Two. 
Finally, let s(e,~h) and t(e,~h) be the payments for DRG-One. 
Because of excessive services, s(e,~h) + t(e,~h) > s(e,~k) + t(e,~k) 
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with strict inequality holding for at least one e. Thus, 
-s h + t h > s k + t k > s a+ t a and DRG-One is more costly than 
Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three. 
Since Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three achieve the first-best 
solution, the best that any reimbursement system can do is to equal 
the performance of these two systems. The result of the above 
analysis reveals that the popular fee-for-service reimbursement system 
and the DRG reimbursement system both allow the physician to exploit 
private information for economic benefit. The result of this 
exploitation is higher medical costs for the patient. The above 
development can be summarized by the following proposition: 
Proposition 9: The two capitation payment reimbursement systems 
identified as Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three are at least as good 
as any existing or proposed reimbursement systems. 
Proposition 9 states the preference of Capitation-Two and 
Capitation-Three over other systems. However, so far no preference 
ranking concerning the remaining, less preferred systems, has been 





s f + t f when p = 0 1 s + t when g g p = 1 
Clearly, ta < ti' i = f, g, h, k, but the relationship of s c to s i is 
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ambiguous. However, it is known that the physician income 
distribution of Capitation-One provides only H to the physician, 
whereas the other systems provide more than H. This suggests thats 
c 
may be less than s .• This observation coupled with the fact that 
1 
t < t., suggests that capitation payment may be superior to the a 1 
remaining three systems. However, no definitive conclusion seems 
possible. 
Comparison of fee-for-service to DRG-One or DRG-Two is clouded 
by the fact that p= 1 is possible for fee-for-service but not for the 
DRGs. If one compares only the case of p= O, then DRG-One dominates 
the fee-for-service system. For p = O, an examination of ~f and ~h 
reveals that s( e,e ) < s( e,e ) in 8 E 0. - Q and s( e,e ) < s( e,e ) 
-h -f 3 -h -f 
fore E r13• A similar relationship holds for th and tf. 
If A= O then DRG-Two dominates DRG-One since s(e,e) < s(e,e) 
-k -h 
with strict inequality holding fore E r12• A similar relationship 
also holds for tk and th. In this case DRG-Two is also preferred to 
fee-for-service when p = o. But when A > 0 is true, the relative 
ranking is again ambiguous. All of this simply means the preference 
among the remaining four systems is ambiguous and conditional on more 
specific facts. For example, claims that DRG reimbursement systems 
will lower medical costs to the patient depends on the frequency and 
importance of preventive medicine provision within a fee-for-service 
system. 
Physician Risk Neutrality 
A somewhat finer ranking of the health care reimbursement 
systems can be obtained if the assumption of physician risk-aversion 
is relaxed. If risk-neutrality is assumed, the payment to the 
,., 
physician for Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three is still H + t. 
a 
...... 
However, for Capitation-One, IP18 (d - t(S,~a)) = H = H implies 
"" d = H + t. This outcome reveals that the only difference between 
a 
Capitation-One and the other two capitation payment systems is the 
payment of a risk premium when risk-aversion is assumed. For 
Capitation-One, the physician has an uncertain income distribution 
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requiring a risk premium when risk-aversion is assumed, but of course 
no such premium exists when risk-neutrality is assumed. In the real 
world the physician has multiple patients and thereby may diversify 
out of much of the variability in an income distribution created by 
only one patient. If true, the implication may be that all three 
capitation payment systems are equally attractive. 
For the fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement systems, excessive 
services still exist. These systems, therefore, cost more than the 
first-best solution. But it is now clear that the Capitation-One 
system is preferred to either fee-for-service or DRG reimbursement. 
Risk-neutrality, however, does not help clarify the relationship 
between fee-for-service reimbursement and DRG reimbursement. 
Information Requirements of Health 
Reimbursement Systems 
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Since the fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement systems evaluated 
in this study do not provide the incentives for the physician to 
select the action vector that would maximize the welfare of the 
patient, this chapter now focuses on the private information 
disclosure requirements that have been made in an attempt to enable 
the patient to write a better contract. 
To write a contract that will force the physician to select an 
appropriate level of preventive, diagnostic, and treatment services, 
it is necessary for the patient to know the true 8, as well as the 
level of~ appropriate to 8. one way that this information can be 
revealed is to require a second medical opinion. Second opinions have 
been required by health insurance companies for many years. As second 
opinions are inconvenient and costly, their use has primarily been 
restricted to those patients with major illnesses. Nevertheless, this 
practice is felt by many to have resulted in a significant reduction 
in unnecessary surgery (Business Week, October 15, 1984, p. 144). 
In 1972, Congress tried to obtain information on 8 and~ through 
Public Law 92-603. This act mandated the establishment of 
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) whose primary 
responsibility was to assure that the health care services paid for by 
Medicare, Medicaid, and the Child Care Services Program were medically 
necessary, met professionally recognized standards of care, and were 
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provided at the most economical level consistent with quality care. 
PSRO activities included both concurrent and retrospective audits of 
individual medical records. Despite a sizeable Federal expenditure on 
this program, studies by both the General Accounting Office and the 
congressional Budget Office have reported that this program was not 
cost effective (Luecke and Freeman, 1981, P• 56). one reason may be 
that the audit technology necessary to disclose 8 and~ does not 
exist. 
Audits have been used for many years in financial environments to 
reveal the private information necessary for owners to properly 
motivate managers. There are several reasons that these audits are 
successful: (1) economic events are quantifiable, (2) the rules for 
recording these events are well defined and broadly accepted, and, (3) 
financial transactions as recorded in accounting records are supported 
by verifiable external evidence. This is not true in the health care 
envirornnent. While some of the information recorded in the medical 
record concerning the patient's true condition is quantifiable or 
externally verifiable (laboratory test results and X-rays are 
examples), much of the information is in the form of subjective 
observations which are not quantifiable nor easily verified once the 
patient has left the hospital. In addition, the formats used to 
record this information are not consistent, but vary from hospital to 
hospital, and from physician to physician. Even if effective audit 
technology existed, medical audits are still costly. They consume 
large amounts of physician time, and they require extensive 
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documentation and administration. 
Through the Social Security Amendments of 1983, congress mandated 
DRG reimbursement. Under this system, the patient is still dependent 
upon medical audits for the revelation of e. The signal for the 
appropriate level of~' however, is built into the reimbursement 
system itself. The designers of DRG Reimbursement recognized that the 
complex nature of medical practice makes it difficult to communicate 
the appropriate level of inputs in a manner that can be understood by 
nontechnical patients. Consequently it is the cost of an appropriate 
level of inputs that is revealed, rather than the level of the inputs 
themselves. Since this cost is communicated to the patient in the 
form of a lump sum (i.e. the cost of the individual components of the 
physician's action vector are not revealed), DRGs are not easily 
adjusted for changes in technology, nor for those differences in 
regional demographic and environmental conditions that are known to 
impact hospital resource consumption. An improvement to this system, 
therefore might be to reveal the cost of each of the major components 
of the DRG (i.e the cost allocated to nursing service, pharmacy, 
radiology, laboratory, etc.) so that these components could be 
individually adjusted as technology changes or as legitimate 
demographic differences in health care costs are documented. 
While DRGs do provide a signal regarding the appropriate level of 
diagnostic and treatment services, they provide no signal for an 
appropriate level of preventive services. One reason is that it is 
difficult to identify what an appropriate level is. For diagnostic 
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and treatment services, appropriate services are defined as those that 
restore the patient to a state of health at the lowest possible price. 
This criterion is useless for defining appropriate preventive 
medicine, as the patient is already well. With no criterion for the 
definition of appropriate preventive medicine, the designers of the 
DRG Reimbursement system chose to exclude payment for this service. 
Of all of the health care reimbursement systems examined by this 
study, the only systems in which the revelation of private information 
is not necessary for the attainment of the action vector most 
appropriate for the patient are those involving capitation payment. 
In these systems the incentives for the physician to select the 
appropriate action choice are imbedded within the reimbursement 
mechanism itself. 
Sununary 
This chapter provides a partial ranking of six health care 
reimbursement systems. Given the assumptions of this model as 
discussed in Chapter Five, if physician risk-aversion is assumed, only 
two reimbursement systems, Capitation-Two and Capitation-Three, 
achieve the first-best solution. These dominate Capitation-One, 
fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement. Comparison of Capitation-One 





Comparison of fee-for-service to DRG-One 
or DRG-Two is clouded by the fact that p = 1 is possible in 
fee-for-service reimbursement but not in DRG reimbursement. If A= 0 
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then DRG-Two dominates DRG-One and fee-for-service reimbursement. 
When A> 0 is true then the relative ranking is ambiguous. All of 
this simply means that the preference among the remaining four systems 
is ambiguous and conditional on more specific facts. 
If physician risk-neutrality is assumed, then the risk premium 
A 
(which is the difference between Hand H) disappears and 
Capitation-One achieves the first-best solution. Since the physician 
is able to diversify away the variability in income distribution 
caused by one patient, physician risk-neutrality may be a realistic 
assumption. If physician risk-neutrality exists, then all three 
capitation payment reimbursement systems may be equally attractive. 
Risk-neutrality, however, does not clarify the relationship between 
fee-for-service reimbursement and DRG reimbursement. 
Since fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement do not provide the 
incentives for the physician to select the action vector most 
appropriate to the patient, this chapter concluded with an examination 
of the private information disclosure requirements that have been made 
in an attempt to enable the patient to write a better contract. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this study was to evaluate the incentives for 
cost control contained within nine health care reimbursement systems. 
One of these systems, the first-best solution, was included for 
comparison purposes only. The other eight represent the major 
reimbursement systems presently found or proposed for the health care 
industry. To evaluate these incentives, an "Adverse Selection -
Medical Setting" agency model was developed. This model differs from 
the usual agency model in that the primary problem addressed is 
adverse selection,·rather than moral hazard. This model was used to 
demonstrate the level of health care inputs that would be chosen by a 
physician under each health care reimbursement system. This action 
choice was then used to determine the patient's welfare loss, which in 
turn was used to rank the reimbursement systems from the standpoint of 
patient welfare. 
Summary of Findings 
Given the assumptions of this model as discussed in Chapter 
Five, if physician risk-aversion is assumed, then the most preferred 
health care reimbursement systems are Capitation-Two and 
Capitation-Three. Both of these achieve the first-best solution (the 
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·provision of e at i + t ) • Capitation-One also achieves e • Here, -a a -a 
however, the payment is s + t. For a risk-averse physician, 
c a 
A A 
s > H. The difference (H - H) is a risk premium that the patient 
c 
must pay the physician to assume the risks of income variability. 
Consequently, Capitation-One is dominated by Capitation-Two and 
Capitation-Three. Comparison of Capitation-One to fee-for-service 
and DRG reimbursement is clouded by the uncertainty regarding the 
relationship of the physician payment under fee-for-service and DRG 
reimbursement, s., to the physician payment under Capitation-One, 
1 
s. Comparison of Fee-for-service reimbursement to DRG-One and 
c 
DRG-Two is clouded by the possibility that the physician may choose 
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preventive medicine under fee-for-service reimbursement but not under 
DRG reimbursement. DRG-Two can be shown to dominate DRG-One only 
when an audit cost of zero is assumed. When a positive audit cost is 
assumed, the relative ranking is again ambiguous. 
If risk neutrality is assumed, then the only change in the 
partial ranking is that Capitation-One, Capitation-Two and 
Capitation-Three all achieve the first-best solution. This is 
~ 
possible since H = H for the risk neutral physician. In this 
situation it is no longer necessary for the patient to pay the 
physician a risk premium to induce him to work under Capitation-One. 
Since the physician may be able to diversify away the variability in 
income caused by the treatment of only one patient, risk neutrality 
may be a realistic assumption. 
Since fee-for-service and DRG reimbursement do not provide the 
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incentives for the physician to select the action vector most 
appropriate to the patient, several attempts have been made to 
mandate the disclosure of private information. While these 
disclosures may enable the patient to write a better contract, their 
ability to solve the problem of adverse selection is unclear. For 
one thing, the approaches are costly (e.g., second opinions and 
audits) and this alone would increase the cost to the patient above 
~ -
H + t even if e is ultimately forced. More promising is the a -a 
capitation payment approach. 
Limitations 
As with most analytical models, simplifying assumptions are made 
that must be evaluated for their influence on the external validity of 
this study. In Chapter Five, Corollary 1A assumes physician 
risk-neutrality. In a real world setting this assumption may be 
difficult to justify. The existance of a large malpractice insurance 
industry is evidence that many physicians would rather pay a certainty 
equivalent in the form of a premium than face the uncertain economic 
exposure from a malpractice suit. Since Corollary 1A does not alter 
the fee-for-service physician's action choice as defined on page 45, 
the assumption of physician risk-aversion in this chapter does not 
influence the reimbursement system ranking that occurs in Chapter Six 
where physician risk-aversion and risk neutrality are considered 
separately. 
The Adverse Selection Model developed in this study assumes that 
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all illnesses are treatable and curable by the end of the period and 
that death is not a state of nature. Certainly these assumptions are 
not consistent with the real world. Future studies utilizing this 
methodology may wish to treat non-curable illness and death as 
additional states of nature. Given this change, an appropriate 
physician action vector might then consist of the the minimum services 
necessary to restore a non-terminal patient to as high a state of 
health as possible, or make the terminal patient as comfortable as 
possible. Since the patient's utility would still not be increased 
through the provision of "excessive services," it is the feeling of 
the author that this addition would not alter the conclusions of this 
model. 
The Adverse Selection Model assumes that hospitals have no 
sources of funds other than patient revenues. In the real world this 
is not entirely true as many hospitals have fund raising programs. 
Since most of these do not cover more than a small proportion of total 
operating expenses, the concept that hospitals cannot indefinately 
provide services unless hospital reimbursement is.at least at a level 
that covers costs is still correct. 
The assumption is made that physicians will always provide at 
least the minimum level of diagnostic and treatment services necessary 
to cure the patient, regardless of the reimbursement system chosen. 
This assumption seems reasonable given a standard of professional1 
! 
ethics and the threat of malpractice or professional censure. While 
it is possible that there are physicians that knowingly choose not to 
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cure their patients, the author feels that if these exist at all, that 
they constitute a very small proportion of the profession. 
The assumption is made that utility is a function of wealth. 
There are obviously other factors from which individuals receive 
utility such as service to humanity. 
In addition to all of these limitations, the author wishes to 
acknowledge the general limitations to the agency model as described 
by Baiman (1982, p. 177). These include the assumption of a single 
agent, an exogenous labor market, and a single period world. 
Recommendations 
Capitation Payment 
Since capitation payment has been shown to be superior to all 
other forms of reimbursement evaluated by this study, the first 
recommendation is that greater attention be given to the national 
implementation of this reimbursement system. While capitation payment 
has been around since 1930, in 1980 there were only 236 Health 
Maintenance Organizations operating in the United States. Of these, 
only 5.5 percent had over 100,000 members, 61 percent having fewer 
than 15,000 members (Brown, 1983 p. 401). Several reasons may be 
cited for the slow growth of this form of health care reimbursement. 
Public Education. One reason that HMOs have not grown rapidly is 
that most people are still unaware of what a Health Maintenance 
Organization is. Prior to 1978 it was illegal in most states for HMOs 
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to advertise. By statute, HMOs were prohibited from conununicating 
their costs, benefits or even organizational structures to the public. 
Partially as a result of this, a 1980 poll revealed that 79 percent of 
the public was still unfamiliar with the term "Health Maintenance 
Organization" (Brown, 1983, p. 402). Certainly for HMOs to experience 
the type of growth needed to significantly impact health care costs, a 
better job needs to be done of conununicating the role that HMOs can 
play in changing the incentives for physician cost behavior. 
Legal Opposition. A second reason for the slow growth of Health 
Maintenance Organizations was opposition from organized medicine. 
State medical associations have been very effective in lobbying for 
legislation curtailing prepaid group practice. Traditional 
constraints have included: 
1. Statutes prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine 
(Eastaugh, 1981, P• 296). 
2. The regulation of direct health service health plans as 
though they were indemnity insurance plans, including excessive 
monetary reserve requirements, restrictions on investment in 
facilities, and adequate provision for capital requirements in rate 
regulation (Birnbaum, 1976, p 19). 
3. Restrictions on hospital staff privileges for physicians 
practicing under anything but fee-for-service reimbursement 
(Feldstein, 1979, p. 295). 
4. Internal Revenue Service rulings that discriminate against 
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group practice corporations (Detsky, 1978, p. 116). 
Some of these restrictions were removed by the Health Maintenance 
Act of 1973. Unfortunately, several Senators saw this act as a 
vehicle to achieve broader social objectives and saddled the industry 
with new requirements, in many ways more restrictive than those the 
act originally intended to remove (Brown, 1983, pp. 239 - 344). This 
act required, for example, that Health Maintenance Organizations offer 
a broader range of services than the fee-for-service insurance plans 
with which they competed, including mental health services, alcohol 
and drug rehabilitation and preventive dental care. The result was to 
price many HMOs out of the market. In addition, capitation payment 
organizations were required to have open enrollments and to meet what 
were felt to be unrealistic financial requirements (Brown, 1983, pp. 
304 - 309). To encourage compliance, HMOs that were unwilling, or 
unable to meet these requirements, were not exempted from punative 
state statutes. 
In 1978 the open enrollment provision of the Health Maintenance 
Act of 1973 was dropped, as was the requirement HMOs provide services 
not required of other insurance plans. Several legislative barriers 
still remain, however. Presently tax laws do not allow as favorable a 
tax treatment for non-profit HMOs as other non-profit health care 
organizations. The differences are in the areas of local property 
taxes, tax shelters for retirement benefits of high income employees, 
and the ability to use charitable contributions as tax write-offs 
(Detsky, 1978, p. 117). This puts HMOs at a competitive disadvantage 
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with respect to non-profit hospitals. A recommendation of this study, 
therefore, is that consideration be given to a redrafting of this 
section of the tax code. 
In most states, the ability of HMOs to expand is restricted by 
certificate-of-need laws (Feldstein, 1979, p. 248). These laws 
attempt to restrain increases in health care costs through 
restrictions on the expansion of hospital beds and equipment 
(Feldstein, 1979, p. 243). While the objective of these statutes is 
commendable, they do favor existing health care providers and have 
been effectively used to prohibit capitation payment plans from 
building their own health care facilities. It might be productive, 
therefore, to evaluate the possible exemption of capitation payment 
plans from health planning regulations, at least until this 
reimbursement system has established itself in the marketplace. 
Non-legal Barriers. Not all of the barriers to the establishment 
of HMOs on a national basis are legal. Some are economic. One 
problem that many capitation payment groups have run into is the large 
amount of capital required to start the traditional HMO. From the 
beginning state medical societies made it impossible for capitation 
physicians to join the medical staffs of community hospitals 
(Feldstein, 1979, p. 295). Consequently, most of the early plans were 
forced to build their own inpatient facilities. While hospital staff 
restrictions against group practice physicians have been lifted im 
most states, there are those who still feel that HMOs can only succeed 
in controlling costs if they own the hospitals in which their 
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physicians practice {Eastaugh, 1981, p. 143), The success of other 
models, however, suggests that HMOs can be cost effective even when 
their physicians practice out of hospitals controlled by 
fee-for-service physicians (Eastaugh, 1981, pp. 141 - 144). Further 
research needs to be done in identifying those forms of capitation 
payment that are not only cost effective, but easy to implement. One 
organization with that potential is the Preferred Provider 
Organization (PPO). PPOs are groups of physicians who market their 
services to employee groups under a prenegotiated payment schedule. 
All have the following common characteristics (Lundy and Blacker, 
1983): 
1. They consist of panels of health care providers, some of 
which may be hospitals. 
2. They market services to employee groups or unions for a 
prenegotiated payment. 
3. They discount rates in return for increased patient volumes 
and commitments to prompt payment. 
4. They employ hospital utilization controls. 
Most PPOs market their services on a discounted fee-for-service basis 
(Lundy and Blacker, 1983). There is no reason, however, that 
capitation payment could not be used as well. Provided that an 
adequate number of capitation payment PPOs could be found, one useful 
study might compare the operating costs of these organizations to the 
traditional (i.e. Kaiser model) HMO. 
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DRG Reimbursement 
Although capitation payment has been shown to be be analytically 
superior to DRG reimbursement, the significant political and financial 
investment made by Congress and the Administration in the enactment of 
the Social Security Amendments of 1983 might indicate that this 
reimbursement system will be around for many years to come. Since 
literally billions dollars will be channeled through this program, 
research directed at improving this reimbursement system appears 
warranted. 
Since it has been demonstrated that the revelation of private 
information can reduce the patient's welfare loss, attention should be 
given to the development of an audit technology that will enable 
medical audits to reveal, at a reasonable cost, the true state of 
nature. There exists in the accounting field a large body of 
knowledge on the audit technology necessary to reveal private 
information. It is possible that much of this might be applied to the 
field of medical audits. Without an effective audit technology, the 
DRG reimbursement system cannot achieve its objective of effective 
hospital cost control. 
Certain services traditionally provided by hospitals are not 
easily accommodated by DRG reimbursement. One of these is medical 
education. Congress has recognized that teaching hospitals 
legitimately have higher costs, and has directed the Health Care 
Financing Administration to see that these are adequately reimbursed. 
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As an equitable method to include these costs in the DRG has yet to be 
developed, (Ernst and Whinney, 1983) the development of such a system 
might be a useful field of study. 
In the program used by the Yale Study to calculate the lump sum 
payment for each DRG, "hospital length of stay" was used as the 
surrogate for "resource consumption." Since it is known that the 
intensity of medical inputs is not homogeneous over the entire 
hospital length of stay, a productive study might focus its attention 
on the discovery of a better surrogate. 
Many hospitals have traditionally shifted the economic risk of 
serious illness by undercharging for the more complex products and 
services, and overcharging for the less complex products and services 
(Howard, 1984). Under Fee-for-service reimbursement it was not 
important that hospital charges be highly correlated as the hospital 
could always increase its prices if it appeared that charges were not 
going to cover costs, and as patients had no recourse but to pay the 
hospital what was billed. 
Since hospital charges were used as the surrogate for hospital 
costs in the development of DRGs, it might be interesting to evaluate 
the impact that DRGs will have on the future mixture and availability 
of hospital services. If the use of a biased surrogate causes DRGs to 
under-reimburse hospitals for the more complex procedures, then the 
large speciality centers may have a difficult time surviving DRG 
reimbursement, and certain patients with the more complicated 
illnesses might eventually find themselves excluded from the health 
care marketplace. Empirical verification of these trends might be 
useful. Other studies might focus on finding a more suitable 
surrogate for hospital costs than hospital charges, or on the 
development of DRG costing techniques that will reveal true costs, 
thus eliminating the need for a surrogate. 
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With the resolvement of the hospital charges versus hospital 
costs issue, it is possible that DRG reimbursement might achieve the 
objective of providing a quantifiable standard of resource consumption 
by category of illness. Even if this occurs, however, one significant 
criticism of this reimbursement system will still remain, this system 
is not "outcome oriented." In the formulation of the regression used 
to define each DRG, the dependent variable used was resource 
consumption rather than rate-of-cure. It seems to the author that a 
more appropriate reimbursement system would be concerned with both the 
quality and the cost, of health of care. One of the side benefits of 
DRG reimbursement will be an expanded base of medical information. To 
receive reimbursement, it will be necessary for hospitals to 
accumulate both financial and medical information for each patient in 
each DRG. Attention should be given to determining if this expanded 
data base can be used to refine DRGs and improve medical decision 
making on a local level. 
Summary 
Chapter Seven reviewed the findings of this study and recormnended 
several future areas of study. Since the Capitation Payment 
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reimbursement dominates all other systems examined, greater attention 
should be given to the national implementation of capitation payment. 
One reason for the slow growth of HMOs is public unawareness of the 
benefits of this reimbursement mechanism. Public opinion polls have 
indicated that most consumers do not understand the impact that 
reimbursement incentives have on physician cost behavior, and the role 
that HMOs can play in changing these incentives. One recommendation, 
therefore, is greater public education. 
A second reason for the slow growth of HMOs has been opposition 
from organized medicine. While the HMO Act of 1973, and its 1978 
amendment removed some of the legal barriers to the establishment of 
capitation payment forms of organization, others remain. Several 
areas of study were suggested that might help ease the legal problems 
faced by prospective HMOs. 
A third reason for the slow growth of HMOs is the significant 
capital investment required to start a capitation payment plan. One 
useful area of study, therefore, might direct its attention to the 
development of new forms of capitation payment that are cheaper to 
implement that some of the traditional models. 
Although capitation payment has been shown to be be analytically 
superior to DRG reimbursement, the significant political and financial 
resources that were invested by congress and the administration in the 
enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 might indicate 
that this reimbursement system will be around for many years to come. 
Since literally billions of Medicare and Medicaid dollars will be 
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channeled through this program, several studies directed at improving 
this reimbursement system were suggested. These include studies to 
develop the audit technology necessary to reveal private information 
in a medical setting, studies to discover better surrogates for 
resource consumption and hospital costs, studies on the impact of DRG 
reimbursement on the future mixture and availability of hospital 
services, and studies on ways in which the DRG reimbursement system 
can be made more "outcome oriented." 
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APPENDIX A 
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ADVERSE 
SELECTION MODEL 
1. The patient can observe, but is unable to evaluate the actions 
of the physician. 
2. The states of nature are discrete. 
3. The patient is unable to determine the true state of nature. 
4. The physician can always determine the true state of 
nature perfectly. The physician is qualified to treat all 
illnesses. 
s. The utility of the patient, and the utility of the physician, 
are both functions of wealth. 
6. We assume a one period world, with a finite number of 
illnesses. 
7. The states of nature are ranked according to the severity of 
illness. The higher states of nature require a longer 
treatment than the lower states of nature. 
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a. The more severe the illness, the lower the probability of its 
occurrence. 
9. The physician holds medical staff privileges in a primary care 
hospital, where a primary care hospital is defined as an 
inpatient facility serving a population base large enough to 
justify the acquisition of noncomplex hospital equipment, but 
too small to fully utilize the the more specialized equipment. 
10. In all reimbursement systems but capitation payment, physician 
charges are a function of the volume and complexity of 
physician services rendered (this is referred to as the 
physician volume - complexity assumption). 
11. Hospitals have no source of patient funds other than patient 
revenue and cannot therefore provide preventive, diagnostic or 
treatment services unless hospital reimbursement is at least at 
a level that covers costs (this is referred to as the hospital 
actual cost reimbursement assumption). 
12. In all reimbursement systems, hospital costs are a function of 
the volume and complexity of hospital services rendered (this 
is referred to as the hospital volume - complexity assumption). 
13. The action of the physician is a sequential three stage 
process, (1) the physician provides preventive medicine at the 
beginning of the period and then the state of nature occurs, 
(2) the physician next chooses a level of diagnostic services 
necessary to detennine the state of nature, and (3) then 
chooses the treatment. 
14. The physician will always provide at least the minimum level of 
diagnostic and treatment services needed to cure the patient, 
regardless of the reimbursement system chosen by the patient. 
In addition, the physician will never provide an excessive 
level of diagnostic and treatment services if the provision of 
such services would harm the patient (this is referred to as 
the minimum ethics assumption). 
15. All illnesses are treatable and curable by the end of the 
period. 
16. Death is not a state of nature. 
17. The provision of preventive medicine at the beginning of the 
period decreases the probability of every illness during the 
period. 
18. Whenever a physician is faced with two or more actions, both of 
which have equal benefit to the physician, but one of which 
benefits the patient more than the other, the physician will 
choose that action that benefits the patient most (this is 
referred to as the non-perverse behavior assumption). 
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Actual Cost Reimbursement Assumption: The assumption made in 
this study that hospitals have no source of funds other than patient 
revenues and cannot, therefore, provide preventive, diagnostic or 
treatment services unless they are reimbursed at a level at least 
equal with to cost. 
Adverse Selection Model - Medical Setting: An adaptation of the 
traditional agency model which is used in this study to demonstrate 
the appropriate physician action choice under each of the nine health 
care reimbursement systems. 
Ancillary Services: Services other than room, board, and other 
professional services provided by the hospital. Examples include 
X-ray, and laboratory services. 
Capitation Payment: A method of payment for health care services 
in which the provider is paid a fixed per-capita amount irrespective 
of the services actually rendered during a predefined period, such as 
an enrollment year. Three forms of capitation payment are examined in 
this study. 
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Capitation Payment - PPO: For the purpose of this study, a 
Capitation Payment - PPO is a group of physicians who contract on a 
capitation basis for the provision of physician services. In the 
model employed in this study, the PPO assumes no responsibility for 
cost of hospital care. 
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Certificate-of-Need Laws: These state statutes attempt to 
control the growing intensity of medical care through a review process 
mandatory for investment in equipment or facilities exceeding some 
specified dollar amount. 
Community Hospital: A primary care hospital. 
Community Rating: A method whereby the insurer detennines the 
premium rate based on the average costs of all subscribers in a 
specific industry or catchment area, and all individuals pay the same 
rate. Community rating spreads the cost of illness over all the 
subscribers and does not charge higher rates to those currently less 
healthy than the average person. 
Concurrent Review: The monitoring, during the time that a 
patient is hospitalized, of the delivery of care provided. 
Diagnosis: A commonly accepted term to describe a disease. 
Diagnostic Ancillary Services: Those ancillary services used by 
a physician to determine the true diagnosis. 
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Diagnostic Related Group (DRG): A system of classifying patients 
according to type of disease. It was developed by researchers at Yale 
University and contains 467 mutually exclusive and exhaustive disease 
categories or groups. Medicare's prospective payment system is based 
on DRGs. 
Diagnostic Related Group Reimbursement: A reimbursement system 
wherein the provider is paid a fixed fee for each DRG (illness 
category) treated, regardless of the services provided in the 
treatment of that illness. 
Fee-for-service Reimbursement: The traditional reimbursement 
mechanism for both the physician and hospital. For the physician, the 
fee is determined by market forces, for the hospital~ it represents 
full cost reimbursement for the hospital services rendered. 
First-Best Solution Reimbursement: The reimbursement system that 
would be imposed on the physician if there were no private 
information. Under this system, the patient would pay the physician a 
prenegotiated amount if the physician provided an appropriate level of 
preventive, diagnostic and treatment services, and nothing if he did 
not. 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA): The federal agency 
to whom Congress has delegated responsibility for the administration 
of the Medicare program. 
Health Maintenance Organization: A medical organization that 
provides and assures the provision of comprehensive health services 
for an enrolled group of persons under a prepaid capitation 
arrangement. 
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Hospital Volume - Complexity Assumption: The assumption made in 
this study that hospital costs are a function of the volume and 
complexity of services rendered. 
Kaiser Model: An HMO that owns the hospitals in which its 
physicians practice. 
Length of Stay (LOS): The length of an inpatient's stay in a 
hospital, reported as the number of days spent in a facility per 
admission or discharge. 
Medicaid: A federal-state matching program whose designated 
beneficiary group is the poor. The role of the federal government is 
primarily one of sharing the costs of the program with the states, who 
are themselves responsible for defining the eligibility requirements 
and determining the benefit coverage. 
Medical Education: Teaching activities (e.g., training programs 
for nurses, interns, and residents). 
Medical Education Costs: The cost of approved medical education 
programs. Generally, approved educational activities mean formally 
organized or planned programs of study engaged in by hospitals to 
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enhance the quality of care in an institution. 
Medical Record: A record maintained by the hospital in which the 
patient's diagnosis, treatment, and response to treatment is recorded. 
Medicare: A limited national health insurance program for 
individuals eligible for Social Security benefits. Recipient benefits 
include hospital care, skilled nursing facility care following a 
hospital stay, and home health care services. 
Minimum Ethics Assumption: The assumption made in this study 
that the physician will always provide the minimum level of diagnostic 
and treatment services needed to restore the patient to a state of 
health and will never provide an excessive level of these services if 
the provision of such services would harm the patient. 
Morbidity: The rate of disease or proportion of diseased 
persons. 
Mortality: The death rate. 
Open Enrollment: A provision of the HMO Act of 1973 specifying 
that Federal HMOs must allow, for at least 30 days each year, the 
enrollment of any individual, regardless of past medical history or 
existing medical conditions. The premium for these individuals was to 
be determined using a "community rating." This provision was removed 
by a 1978 amendment 30 days each year, the enrollment of any 
individual, regardless of past medical history or existing medical 
conditions. The premium for these individuals was to be determined 
using a "community rating." This provision was removed by a 1978 
amendment. 
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Opportunity Cost of Employment: The amount that must be paid to 
a physician to induce him to work for a patient or medical 
organization. 
Patient Welfare Loss: Defined in this study the total payment by 
the patient for health care. 
Peer Review Organization (PRO}: An entity composed of a 
substantial number of doctors of medicine or osteopathy, 
representative of the practicing physicians in an area, and judged by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to be capable of auditing 
health care. These organizations are currently replacing PSROs and 
will be responsible for medical auditing under DRG Reimbursement. 
Physician Action Vector: A vector of medical inputs selected by 
the physician in the treatment of a specific illness. 
Physician Volume - Complexity Assumption: The assumption made in 
this paper that in all reimbursement systems but capitation payment, 
the physician's charge is a function of the volume and complexity of 
services rendered. 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PRO}: A payment arrangement 
whereby groups of physicians contract with corporations or unions to 
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provide medical services. 
Preventive Medicine: Those physician and hospital services which 
when rendered to a patient reduce the likelihood of future disease. 
Primary Hospital: An inpatient health care facility whose 
primary function is to provide non-specialized hospital care. 
Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO): Physician or 
other professional medical organizations (established by the 1972 
amendments to the Social Security Act and financed 100 percent by the 
federal government) that were charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that payments for Medicare and Medicaid were medically 
necessary, provided in accordance with professional standards, and 
rendered in an appropriate setting. The Peer Review Improvement Act 
of 1982 repealed the PSRO program (effective September 3, 1982) and 
provided instead for the establishment of a utilization and quality 
control peer review program. Under the existing law, PSROs will not 
be terminated until a contract with a peer review organization is 
established in the same geographic area. 
Probability Revision Assumption: The assumption made in this 
study that the provision of preventive medicine decreases the 
probability of every illness during the period. 
Reimbursement System: For the purpose of this paper, a 
reimbursement system is defined as one physician and one hospital fee 
schedule. 
Retrospective Review: The audit of hospital admission and 
treatment after a patient has been discharged. 
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Severity of Illness: The relative level of loss of function and 
mortality normally caused by a particular illness. 
Specialty Hospital: An inpatient health care facility whose 
primary objective is to provide the more complex or specialized levels 
of hospital care. 
State of Nature: The patient's state of health. 
Target Income Hypothesis: A theory that physicians have control 
over their own markets and thus can create their own demand to achieve 
specific targeted incomes. 
Third-party Payer: An organization that pays for or insures 
health or medical expenses on behalf of its beneficiaries or 
subscribers. Third party payers act as the agent between the provider 
and the consumer. Third-party payers include Medicare, Medicaid, Blue 
Cross, Blue Shield, and commercial insurance companies. 
Utilization Review: The monitoring of activities involved in lthe 
treatment of patients. There are three main reasons for utilization 
review: (1) it is required by law for Medicare payment1 (2) it is 
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